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Introduction

We are so pleased to issue our second edition of Integritas the Nipissing University Student Journal of History. Through the tireless efforts of our master's students this collection of undergraduate work shows the lengths undergraduates are willing to go for the sake of research and history. I personally could not thank them enough for their contributions to the journal and we at Integritas hope to see more students here show their intellectual prowess and help make their own proud contributions to history.

Kristian Harris
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The Perfect Homemaker:
Gendered Representations in the *Northern Messenger*

Tatianna Webb

> "Her house is a model of neatness,/ not alone for cleanliness sake,/ But for the good of her loved ones,/ And the comfort they there may take,/ Her parlor is light and cheery,/ And never too good for use,/ Her kitchen the cosiest workshop,-/ Not a prison for drudge or recluse!"[1]

This excerpt is from the *Northern Messenger*, featured in a section entitled "The Household." The newspaper ran this column, with articles of similar relevance, during the late nineteenth century. The gendered language used and the roles described are noticeable and persevere for over a decade. This raises questions about the gendered roles expressed within the newspaper. How are gender roles represented in the column? What makes a good homemaker in 1880s and 1890s Montreal? What does this tell us about women in Montreal in the 1880s? What purpose do the gender roles serve?

The *Northern Messenger,* a newspaper circulating in Montreal and New York, contained a segment named "The Household" beginning in 1981 and ending in 1896. The segment was aimed at middle class anglophone women in late nineteenth-century Montreal. This project contributes an analysis on the gender roles the *Northern Messenger* portrays as expected of middle class women in nineteenth-century Montreal. The newspaper was an "inexpensive semi-monthly temperance review."[2] This was vast influence on the content of the paper. John Jr. and two of his siblings took over the *Northern Messenger* when their father moved to New York in 1870 to create another newspaper.[3] When "The Household" came into effect in 1880, John Sr.'s children were running the newspaper. The section ceased to be featured in 1896, but the newspaper continued publishing until 1935.[4] As such, this analysis is restricted to 1880 until

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[1] J. Dougall and Son, "The Household," *Northern Messenger*, Jan 9, 1891, pg. 3.
[2] Joanna Dean, *Religious Experience and the New Woman: The Life of Lily Dougall* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007): 19. The book also contains more information about the family who ran the newspaper.
[3] Dean, *Religious Experience of the New Woman*, 19, 21.
[4] History of the Book in Canada Project, *History of the Book in Canada: 1840-1918*, 2 vols, ed. Yvan Lamonde, Patricia Lockhart Fleming, and Fiona Black (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005): 2: 300.

1896. Due to the vast quantity of surviving issues, the analysis is further restricted to the use of columns from the winter months: January, February, March, and December.

Newspapers provide insight to cultural trends of the society they were written in. Newspapers reflect and promote societal norms and ideals.[5] Newspapers serve to promote group identities and popularize clichéd notions of modernity.[6] Major trends that were frequently present in newspapers include: the fear society was being undermined, the spread of Christianity, the advancement of literacy, and notions of gender roles.[7] Newspapers have historically aimed to create a distinct Canadian identity.[8] Newspapers are popular because they revolve around the common aspects of life for many ordinary men and women.[9]

The trends from Montreal influenced the gendered representations in the paper. Social trends in Montreal during the time included both gender roles and religion. During the end of the nineteenth century, radicals were concerned with a breakdown and ineffectiveness of over-arching and deeply felt ethics and values.[10] There was a growing public desire for Christianity to be the base of Canadian society and law.[11] Religion also intersected with the Temperance

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[5] Paul Rutherford, *A Victorian Authority: The Daily Press in Late Nineteenth-Century Canada*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982): 156.
[6] Rutherford, *A Victorian Authority*, 156; See also Douglas Fetherling, *The Rise of the Canadian Newspaper*, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1990) for more information about the circulation of newspapers and differences in newspapers for the different classes.
[7] Rutherford, *A Victorian Authority*, 157, 158, 177.
[8] Frederick J. Fletcher, *The Newspaper and Public Affairs: Research Studies on the Newspaper Industry*, Vol 7. (Ottawa: Royal Commission on Newspapers, 1981): 8. The work also contains more information on how newspapers serve to create a sense of Canadian identity.
[9] Martin Conboy, "Introduction: Popular Press: Theory and History," in *The Press and Popular Culture* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2002), **DOI:** http://dx.doi.org.roxy.nipissingu.ca/10.4135/9781446219898.n1. Conboy also includes more extensive information how the press allowed for popular culture to expand and create a societal reliance on it.
[10] Gene Howard Homel, "'Fading Beams of the Nineteenth Century:' Radicalism and Early Socialism in Canada's 1890s," *Labour/ Le Travailleur* 5 (1980): 7. The work also contains more information on the rise of socialism taking place during the time.
[11] Homel, "Fading Beams of the Nineteenth Century," 13, 15. See Danylewycz, "Changing Relationships: Nuns and Feminists in Montreal, 1890-1925," *Histoire Sociale/Social History* 14, No. 28 (1981) for more information on the role of the church and feminists interaction and support of the church.

movement. Many middle class women were members of temperance groups.[12] The female leadership within the temperance movement served to make women more active outside the house and give them power within the community. Religion also influenced the societal ideals of a woman's role in society. Even feminists who were advocating for change adhered to roles of homemaking and motherhood.[13] A woman's place was seen as in the home.[14] Marrying and raising a family may have been expected of women, but some women did desire this lifestyle.[15] Most women intended to marry, have children, and tend a house.[16] However, this would have been influenced by societal expectations. When "The Household" was circulating, there was a dominant trend to provide advice columns designed towards homemakers.[17] Tension existed between the ideal of the homemaker and the reality that a significant portion of Montreal women needed to be wage earners.[18] Montreal society wished for women to remain out of the public workforce to do the roles associated with the homemaker. The role of the housewife interacted with larger housing conditions in Montreal during the time.[19] Montreal housing was unsanitary and experienced rampant overcrowding.[20] The population in the urbanized area grew rapidly as it

[12] Adam Coombs, "Liberty and Community: The Political Ideas of the Nineteenth-Century Canadian Temperance Movement," *Graduate History Review* 3, No. 1 (2011): 8.
[13] Danylewycz, "Changing Relationships," 416.
[14] Alison Prentice, Paula Bourne, Gail Cuthbert Brandt, Beth Light, Wendy Mitchinson, and Naomi Black, *Canadian Women: A History* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988): 143.
[15] Prentice et al., *Canadian Women: A History*, 143.
[16] Prentice et al., *Canadian Women: A History*, 143. See Bradbury's *Wife to Widow* for more on the husband's possession of their wives and what the average houses and lives of different levels of income earning families looked like.
[17] Wall, ed. Baker, *Families*, 93.
[18] Prentice et al., *Canadian Women: A History*, 113.
[19] See Jason Gilliland, and Sherry Olson, "Claims on housing space in nineteenth-century Montreal," *Urban History Review/Revue d'histoire urbaine* 26, no. 2 (1998). Also, Olson,'s "Feathering her Nest," explores goods given to newly wed couples. Bettina Bradbury's *Wife to Widow: Lives, Laws, and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Montreal* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011): 88-97 discusses the average furnishings of middle class houses.
[20] Bettina Bradbury, *Working Families: Age, Gender, and Daily Survival in Industrializing Montreal* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1993): 71. See Sherry Olson, "Feathering her Nest in Nineteenth-Century Montreal." *Histoire Sociale/Social History* 33, No. 65 (2000) for more information on the conditions of the average Montreal house, and the conditions of rental housing.

doubled from 1860-1880 and again in 1880-1900.[21] These trends influenced the newspaper's content and the advice for women within the segment in this changing atmosphere.

Class is an important factor to consider when analyzing the gendered roles present in the *Northern Messenger*.[22] Many middle class women in Montreal would have been literate. The middle class was moving away from private tutoring and advocating for a public school system.[23] Many middle class women would have earned money by having borders in their house.[24] The newspaper neglects to mention this because the societal ideal was for the woman to only care for the house. Notions of private domesticity had grown and women were thought to be best suited in the private sphere.[25] Therefore, the newspaper wanted to encourage middle class women to stay in the domestic sphere and minimize the amount of women working.

The role of mother and housewife is also important to consider for this segment. The housewife played a crucial role in a time without technology.[26] There were dominant influences upon parenting and assumptions that couples would reproduce.[27] When "The Household" was written, there were changing ideals and contention about how to properly mother children.[28] There were beliefs that mothering should include a significant Christian influence and that mothers had to teach children religion which would build character in the process.[29]

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[21] Patricia Thornton and Sherry Olson, "A Deadly Discrimination Among Montreal Infants." *Continuity and Change* 16, No. 1 (2001): 95.
[22] See Bettina Bradbury and Tamara Myers, eds. *Negotiating Identities in 19th and 20th Century Montreal* (UBC Press, 2014) for further information on marginalized groups in Montreal. See Bradbury's *Working Families* for attention to working class women in Montreal during the late nineteenth century.
[23] Chad Gaffield, "Children, Schooling, and Family Reproduction in Nineteenth-Century Ontario," *The Canadian Historical Review* 72, No. 2 (1991): 176.
[24] Mary P. Ryan, *Cradle of the Middle Class: The Family in Oneida County, New York, 1780-1865* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981): 201.
[25] Ryan, *Cradle of the Middle Class*, 146
[26] Eds. Maureen Baker, *Families: Changing Trends in Canada*, 6th ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 2009): 60.
[27] Baker, *Families: Changing Trends in Canada*, 62.
[28] Ryan, *Cradle of the Middle Class*, 162.
[29] Ryan, *Cradle of the Middle Class*, 98-99.

This paper focuses on a portion of the dominant gender roles presented within the column. The focus is on representations of motherhood, the ideals of a good housekeeper, and the relation of women to food and food preparation. The representations in this newspaper are important to focus upon as they challenge dominate notions that middle class women did not need to be persuaded to maintain their role as homemaker. Furthermore, it challenges notions that women did not have power within the house, or feel that they were worthy of power.

The gendered reading of this newspaper allows insight to the Montreal middle class. While the newspaper circulated, advice columns to women were extremely common.[30] The exclusion of men within the column created a space distinctly for women. The newspaper demonstrated an expectation that married middle class women would remain in the home as the caretaker of the home and the children within it. The newspaper aimed to have women utilize this identity and gain a sense of empowerment. Society pressured women into the role of housewife, and the column served to instil messages that women did have power and autonomy within their role as a homemaker. Empowering women within the role of homemaker was desired to make women feel more satisfied with their role and remain in the home.

The *Northern Messenger* demonstrates how motherhood was seen as a central and obligatory role of married middle class women. During this time, religion played a role in daily lives, especially in the role of mother and wife.[31] However, the role of mother also had other influences. Parents were influenced by norms of heterosexuality, social expectations of parenthood, unreliable contraception, lack of public childcare services, and permanence of marriage.[32] Married couples were expected to begin reproducing shortly after marriage. This can

[30] Baker, *Families: Changing Trends in Canada,* 93.
[31] Prentice et al., *Canadian Women: A History*, 151.
[32] Baker, *Families: Changing Trends in Canada,* 62.

be seen with the popularity of cradles as a wedding gift.[33] Women were told that normal women desired children.[34] Mothers were seen as valuable people. One article in the *Northern Messenger* described mothers as the "most precious thing in the household."[35] It wrote that women were worth more to their child as a "mother, a counselor [sic], a close personal friend" than as a "seamstress or caterer."[36] Often times, women were willing to give up professions outside the home upon marriage because they believed continued employment would cause their family to suffer.[37] The importance of the role of mother was utilized to encourage women to forgo work outside of the home. However, since society expected and desired women in this role, the segment served to make women feel more empowered and make the role more enticing.

During the late nineteenth century, there were frequent articles advising women how to properly discipline and socialize their children.[38] Within this literature, mothers were often told that properly trained children were easier to care for.[39] This appealed to the desire to have a life with fewer struggles. A significant portion of the articles in "The Household" mention discipline. Within the articles, there are frequent religious references. An article entitled "On Punishment" begins with a biblical verse and wrote "children must be taught to obey" and "severe discipline" can be used to achieve obedience.[40] The column continued on by writing that corporal punishment must be used if the child did not learn obedience.[41] The article does mention that the punishment should not be common within the house and only used when necessary.[42] Parents were expected to discipline their children, but not use severe punishment on a regular basis. Most

[33] Sherry Olson, "Feathering her Nest," 15.
[34] Prentice et al., *Canadian Women: A History*, 150.
[35] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Mar 20, 1891, pg. 3.
[36] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Mar 20, 1891, pg. 3.
[37] Prentice et al., *Canadian Women: A History*, 150.
[38] Baker, *Families: Changing Trends in Canada*, 93.
[39] Baker, *Families: Changing Trends in Canada*, 93.
[40] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Dec 1, 1880, pg. 3.
[41] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Dec 1, 1880, pg. 3.
[42] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Dec 1, 1880, pg. 3.

of the disciplinary articles open with phrases about both parents but continue on to only mention the role of the mother. An article wrote of a mother's threat of the rod causing children to lie.[43] The article continued to write that parents are not be feared and their children should be able to confide in them.[44] The articles encouraged discipline, but cautioned against parents using it too frequently. They reasoned it caused children to lie and thus went against the desired outcome of a well mannered child. In these articles, women were frequently sited as in charge of disciplining the children. This would make the women feel empowered in their role of mother and allow them to feel they were respected and influential within the household.

The articles also mention disciplining children in front of others. One article mentioned children should not be reproved in front of others.[45] It advised mothers to talk to the child about their behaviour after they were alone.[46] It provided an anecdotal story about a mother who stood by this rule and pulled an unruly away from their guests before she talked to him.[47] The popular notion of the nurturing mother relying on the father to discipline the children is challenged. This article demonstrates a notion that even with the husband present, the women have the power and responsibility to discipline the children. Presenting the mother in this manner would have served to make women feel as if they were empowered and an influential body within the house. This would serve to validate their work and make the role of homemaker more appealing.

Homemakers were portrayed as having a significant role within the development of children's character traits. The articles mention trusting children to encourage development. One article began by mentioning that both parents have to trust the child, but continued on to give instructions for how mothers could make a child reliable and remarks it was a job best done by

[43] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Jan 16, 1882, pg. 3.
[44] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Jan 16, 1882, pg. 3.
[45] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 19, 1892, pg. 3.
[46] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 19, 1892, pg. 3.
[47] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 19, 1892, pg. 3.

the mother.[48] It mentioned that the mother's trust allows children to feel proud and happy.[49] Another article regarding trust, opened with "Do [sic] mothers trust their children sufficiently?"[50] It continued on with a woman's memory of her mother accusing her of something despite her repeated proclamations of innocence to the point where she eventually confessed to something she did not do.[51] It then created an undesirable separation between the mother and daughter as they are to have a "bond stronger than iron."[52] The article ends by telling women to trust their children as it would protect them from temptation.[53] This was an allusion to the temperance movement of the time and the woman's role in protecting society from alcohol. These articles served not only to make women feel they had power to raise their children to be well mannered people. They also reinforced notions that if women failed to properly parent their children that it would have negative consequences for their personality and their relationship with each other.

The articles also promoted teaching children religion in order to make them upstanding citizens. Montreal residents practiced religion in the home as well as the church.[54] Parents used religion to convert and build character in their children.[55] The articles mention the mother's faith before the the father's love and encouraged parents to trust children as He did.[56] The article mentioned that the "Great All Father," blessed mothers with truth.[57] Mention of the mother before the father presents the mother as the most important influence in the home instilling religion within children. The article "A Story for Mothers" wrote of a kind, cultured, and

[48] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 1, 1881, pg. 3.
[49] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 1, 1881, pg. 3.
[50] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 11, 1887, pg. 3.
[51] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 11, 1887, pg. 3.
[52] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 11, 1887, pg. 3.
[53] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 11, 1887, pg. 3.
[54] Ryan, *Cradle of the Middle Class*, 98.
[55] Ryan, *Cradle of the Middle Class*, 98.
[56] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Mar 15, 1895, pg. 3.
[57] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Jan 28, 1887, pg. 3.

religious woman who failed to directly talk to her son about religion.[58] He attended church and Sunday school, but because of no direct conversations with his mother he claimed no connection to Christ.[59] On his deathbed, the child revealed this knowledge to his mother.[60] The article ended with "If a man's mother does not care for his soul, who will?"[61] The article characterized mothers as a more important influence for religion than church. This portrayal would have allowed the women to feel empowered and driven to train their children in religion. The emphasis on religion also served larger societal goals of converting children, as there was a large societal push for Christianity to be the base of Canadian society when the column was being produced.

The articles discussed teaching children for their future roles. Motherhood also included raising daughters to become good homemakers. Females were expected to learn how to perform their household duties from their mothers.[62] An article discussed how hints passed from mother to daughter were more useful than anything learned at school.[63] The tasks women were to impart included how to make bread and biscuits, wash dishes, iron, sew, set and clear tables, sweep, and dust.[64] The newspaper wrote that mothers go to great lengths to increase their daughters' "chances" in life as they rely largely upon "their looks and manners."[65] The article portrayed mothers as crucial to her daughters' preparedness for the future and served to instil notions that the mother had a powerful role in determining the success of her daughter's future.

The newspaper also described women's crucial role in raising male children. One article described the importance of mothers teaching their children to be tidy as it would save herself,

[58] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 7, 1890, pg. 3.
[59] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 7, 1890, pg. 3.
[60] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 7, 1890, pg. 3.
[61] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 7, 1890, pg. 3.
[62] Ryan, *Cradle of the Middle Class*, 162.
[63] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 15, 1883, pg. 3.
[64] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Jan 2, 1881, pg. 3.
[65] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Dec 15, 1884, pg. 3.

her children, and her future children in law unhappiness.[66] One article encouraged women to teach their sons to be orderly and to wait on themselves so they did not cause extra work for their future wives.[67] It also mentioned having the sons help their mother to learn more about the tasks that she does.[68] The articles presented the mother as the primary factor in a child's success and happiness in the future. Illustrating their role as crucial to the success of their children's future would have encouraged women to dedicate time and effort to motherhood rather than a job.

There were many reasons the woman's role as a housekeeper was important, and their importance continued growing with changes in society. The increase of children in school and the decrease in family size during the end of the nineteenth century meant there were less older children to assist the mother in taking care of the younger children and cleaning.[69] Censuses from 1842 to 1901 show a decrease of mean size in families in the 1860s and again in the 1890s.[70] Simultaneously, the standard of cleanliness and efficiency were growing, largely from the development of germ theory, thus putting more pressure on women.[71] If a woman had a dirty house or let her family wear unclean clothing it could be seen as familial neglect.[72] Ideally, women would have had machinery to aid her duties, but in reality they were often too expensive.[73] Housewives were crucial to the majority of men because the lack of technology made housekeeping and cooking time consuming.[74] Religion factored into the promotion of the gendered role of a woman. Christianity had a significant influence on gender roles because it promoted the beliefs that God created men and women different and as such women had

[66] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Jan 24, 1890, pg. 3.
[67] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Mar 30, 1894, pg. 3.
[68] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Mar 30, 1894, pg. 3.
[69] Prentice et al., *Canadian Women: A History*, 122.
[70] Olson, "Feathering her Nest," 17.
[71] Prentice et al., *Canadian Women: A History*, 122.
[72] Prentice et al., *Canadian Women: A History*, 122.
[73] Prentice et al., *Canadian Women: A History*, 122.
[74] Baker, *Families: Changing Trends in Canada,* 60.

different roles to fill as a mother and housewife.[75] These societal pressures made the role of the homemaker more pressing and increased the desire to keep women in the home.

"The Household" had articles that featured how women were expected to feel towards housekeeping. One article mentioned an address delivered at a social science meeting which proclaimed women naturally had domestic instincts.[76] It mentioned that love for housework can be renewed by "careful thought and courageous resolution."[77] Married women were expected to fulfill the role of housekeeper and women who thought otherwise were criticized. One article stated that "a woman has no business to get married unless she expects to keep house," and mentioned that if she did not know how to be a housekeeper that she should learn immediately.[78] Another article stated that women found it an honour to be considered a good housekeeper.[79] The article wrote that if a woman found she did not enjoy or excel at housekeeping than she should "at once and cheerfully, to fit herself."[80] One article depicted a young woman saying "'Housework is a necessity and should be the pleasantest and healthiest work in the world.'"[81] The newspaper contained this language to promote the role of housekeeper as natural and enjoyable for women. Housekeepers were vital because of the housework that needed to be done. This repeated appearance of gendered language would influence women. The more the women were exposed to the language, the more likely the women would internalize the message and continue in the role of housekeeper that middle class Montreal society valued.

[75] Rutherford, *A Victorian Authority,* 177.
[76] Dougall, *Northern Messenger,* Jan 1, 1886, pg. 3.
[77] Dougall, *Northern Messenger,* Jan 1, 1886, pg. 3.
[78] Dougall, *Northern Messenger,* Jan 1, 1886, pg. 3.
[79] Dougall, *Northern Messenger,* Jan 29, 1886, pg. 3.
[80] Dougall, *Northern Messenger,* Jan 27, 1888, pg. 3.
[81] Dougall, *Northern Messenger,* Mar 27, 1896, pg. 3.

Housekeeping interacted with the role of mother. One article presented a story of a mother and her son Johnnie. Johnnie had a hobby of carpentry that left his room messy.[82] The mother forced Johnnie to move his carpentry elsewhere and cleaned his room which was the "only blot on the perfection of her well-kept house."[83] Johnnie's mother forced him to do his hobby in the lumber yard which resulted in exposure to foul language.[84] The article wrote that children should not be forced out of their home but taught how to clean up their messes.[85] The article maintained that a dirty carpet was better than knowing one's son was happier away from the home.[86] A similar story featured in a different article. It discussed housekeepers who valued neatness above all else and how it negatively affected children. It wrote the story of Mrs. A who sent her children to other houses to play, and eventually the street when her neighbours were tired of hosting.[87] The author wrote of how one child contracted scarlet fever and died.[88] It implied the other children became criminals as it stated that children turn to crime when they are forced to play in the streets.[89] The article said these consequences were because of a mother's desire to keep her house in order.[90] The newspaper wanted to create mother's guilt to ensure mothers were not allowing the role of housekeeper did not outweigh the role of mother. The article alludes to the mother's power in keeping the children safe and wanted the women to feel as if they are in control of their children getting into crime and take steps to prevent it.

The segment frequently mentioned how to plan cleaning to minimize disruption while maximizing efficiency. One article wrote about the order in which women should clean their

[82] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 15, 1881, pg. 3.
[83] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 15, 1881, pg. 3.
[84] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 15, 1881, pg. 3.
[85] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 15, 1881, pg. 3.
[86] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 15, 1881, pg. 3.
[87] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Mar 11, 1887, pg. 3.
[88] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Mar 11, 1887, pg. 3.
[89] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Mar 11, 1887, pg. 3.
[90] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Mar 11, 1887, pg. 3.

houses during spring cleaning.[91] It recommended undertaking various areas of the house over a period of time to not inconvenience the the family.[92] Another article discussed creating a plan for the domestic work to be done that day at the beginning of each day.[93] It then described a young housekeeper who accomplished "more in one day than the majority of women do in two."[94] It described her as working "noiselessly and steadily" and never in a hurry.[95] She cleaned and undertook one task at a time rather than causing "chaos" and "confusion" by undertaking the whole house at once.[96] The article provided a comparison to another housekeeper. The second housekeeper is described as having the house in constant confusion and described as a "cyclone, stirring up every thing with which she came in contact."[97] The women were implied to have power of the state of comfort or confusion of the home. The newspaper wrote of the state of the house in such a way that women would felt they were responsible for making the house calm, productive, and enjoyable. Women viewing housekeeping in such manner would benefit the society that wished to keep the homemaker in the house and keep the house pleasant.

The final piece of this analysis is the newspaper's portrayal of the gendered role of women with food and food preparation. In the late nineteenth century in Montreal, high infant mortality rates caused a swell of parental advice that targeted mothers' behaviour and lack of knowledge.[98] In these advice columns, mothers were given recommendations about cleanliness and proper food preparation.[99] However, the articles gave advice in a manner that promoted women's power as the food provider while making it seem a crucial role to children's livelihood.

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[91] Dougall, *Northern Messenger,* Mar 26, 1886, pg. 3.
[92] Dougall, *Northern Messenger,* Mar 26, 1886, pg. 3.
[93] Dougall, *Northern Messenger,* Feb 25, 1887, pg. 3.
[94] Dougall, *Northern Messenger,* Feb 25, 1887, pg. 3.
[95] Dougall, *Northern Messenger,* Feb 25, 1887, pg. 3.
[96] Dougall, *Northern Messenger,* Feb 25, 1887, pg. 3.
[97] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 25, 1887, pg. 3.
[98] Baker, *Families: Changing Trends in Canada,* 93.
[99] Baker, *Families: Changing Trends in Canada*, 93.

Throughout the articles, food was often connected to the care of children. It discussed what should not be given to children such as sour apples, raw turnips and carrots, sweets, tea, or whisky.[100] The articles promoted plain and wholesome foods as best for children; the recommended foods including bread, butter, potatoes, milk, and broth.[101] Articles that described the ideal diet for children often only included female pronouns of the person preparing meals. At the end of one article it mentioned that the "indulgent mother" would view the diet as simple but wrote they would find their children demonstrated favourable health if followed and she would not regret "her decision."[102] Women were written as having the decision making power over their children's diet. The articles also discussed the importance of food to children's growth.[103] One article mentioned how a lack of good food would inhibit a child's healthy development and wrote about an instance in which a mother saved a sick young girl when she mixed potatoes into the bread dough.[104] It stated that "no mother-duty is more important than the giving of personal attention to the food her children eat."[105] The language choice demonstrated that mothers were in charge of the children's diet with no mention of the father's influence. The mother is shown as responsible for ensuring her children develop well and survive. The newspaper served to portray the woman's role as the provider of food as a crucial and powerful role to make is appealing.

The food the women prepared interacted with the temperance movement. One article warned nursing mothers to not use beer or ale despite friend of physician recommendations.[106] The article wrote that the ale then becomes part of the milk given to the infant and is poisonous

[100] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Dec 1, 1880, pg. 3.
[101] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Dec 1, 1880, pg. 3.
[102] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 15, 1881, pg. 3.
[103] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 15, 1883, pg. 3.
[104] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Mar 2, 1894, pg. 3.
[105] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 15, 1883, pg. 3.
[106] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 25, 1887, pg. 3.

to their system.[107] The article, sourced from the *Temperance Star*, said it would turn children into drunks when they grew older.[108] An similar article blamed the husband's drinking on the unsatisfactory cooking of the housewife.[109] It stated that men who are unsatisfied by their meals sought out alcohol to feel satisfied.[110] The temperance movement influenced the newspaper, and as such it wanted the female readership to also be concerned and feel they had power and methods to avoid alcoholism. This was a reflection of the societal trends of women being concerned with the temperance movement and trying to influence their families to avoid alcohol. However, the paper gave the women ideas about how to avoid alcoholism while also benefitting the family who would receive better meals, both of which would have been ideal for society.

The articles mention the importance of the family table to the household. One wrote of the conversation over shared meals as important, but also stressed that neat table presentation taught children lessons.[111] Another article mentioned how children eating at the table aided their development of manners.[112] One article wrote of the importance of keeping children involved in conversation at the dinner table.[113] It stated that the inclusion of children in stimulating discussion spurred learning and respect.[114] It also wrote that the mother should not be disordered or remark that it has been the first time she has sat down that day.[115] The article described that the company at the table needed to be agreeable because it allowed food to digest better.[116] The newspaper displays the women as having a crucial role in the family interactions and the consequential development at the dinner table. The suggestions served to portray women as

[107] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 25, 1887, pg. 3.
[108] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 25, 1887, pg. 3.
[109] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Mar 22, 1889, pg. 3.
[110] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Mar 22, 1889, pg. 3.
[111] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Dec 1, 1880, pg. 3.
[112] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 15, 1883, pg. 3.
[113] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 21, 1890, pg. 3.
[114] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Feb 21, 1890, pg. 3.
[115] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Dec 1, 1880, pg. 3.
[116] Dougall, *Northern Messenger*, Dec 1, 1880, pg. 3.

having a powerful influence over the dinner table. Thus, it would maker more likely to put more effort into ensuring the dinner table looked presentable, the food tasted good, and the company would be pleasant; all of which were desired by Montreal society.

This work challenges the popularized ideal that women were perfectly content as homemakers. “The Household” demonstrates that Montreal society felt that the middle class homemakers needed persuasion to remain in the home in the desired domestic role. Thus they created this female space to provide advice to make their tasks easier and stories to make them feel their role in the house was important. Most of the female readership would have already been middle class housewives, thus the segment article aimed to make the women feel empowered and satisfied with their role in order to persuade them to remain a homemaker.

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The Battle of Mount Sorrel: Canada's Inevitable Defeat

Ty Backer

The Battle of Mount Sorrel in early June 1916 is known to be one of the most catastrophic engagements for the Canadians on the Western Front. The Germans were able to obtain control over the strategic location by vigorously annihilating the Canadian-held positions. The British literature and official accounts display the initial phases of battle as a great failure of the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Even after the recapture of Mount Sorrel, the Canadian accomplishment was referred to by British historian James Edmonds, as an "unqualified success."[117] Even though, the Canadians at Mount Sorrel were heavily decimated, it is unfair to conclude that the Canadian effort was a failure. Therefore, this essay will analyze the initial defeat at Mount Sorrel and argue the many ways in which the Canadians were subjected to failure on June 2, 1916. Ultimately, the essay will be reassessing the actual reasons for the Canadian defeat at Mount Sorrel through examination of weather and topography factors, the proficient German preparations and the many internal difficulties suffered at the time of the attack. It is to be made clear that the paper will, in no ways, be approaching the study in a nationalistic means, but rather in a way that demonstrates how the Canadians were uprightly victimized by a hopeless outcome. Once that is concluded, it will be possible to observe how the reasons for defeat would also come to aid the Canadians in launching their successful counter-attack.

To begin, the first half of 1916 brought little encouragement to the Allies. The stalemate in the Ypres Salient continued from the previous year and the German presence only grew increasingly more menacing. Accordingly, Allied planners agreed to join forces in a full-scale offensive after 1 July, 1916. The area of attack decided upon was the Somme, but in the meantime, General Joffre and his French forces needed the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to

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[117] James Edmonds, *Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1916. Vol. 1. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents*.(London: Macmillan and, Limited, 1932), 241.

adopt a new war policy. Since the French had lost approximately two million men, the French Army was not immediately ready to undertake a large operation. Henceforth, the BEF was tasked with enduring the German offensives in the Ypres Salient until the operation at the Somme could be launched. The Canadian Corps was assigned to defend the southern part of the salient during the early months of the summer. After the debacle at St. Eloi in April, the 2nd Canadian Division was now responsible for guarding an advantageous position which overlooked enemy trenches. This area extended nearly a thousand yards east of Hill 60 all the way to the Hooge past Sanctuary Wood.[118] The Germans desired acquisition of this line because it held many commanding positions that would eliminate the threat of enemy high ground and would provide access to the BEF's rear in the salient. One of these key positions on the line was the flat hillside named Mount Sorrel.

At 8 a.m. on 2 June 1916, the 3rd Canadian Division on the front line of Mount Sorrel, were awakened by German artillery.[119] The Württemberg Corps shelled the Canadian defensive positions for over 4 hours. The barrage of bombs would cause outright destruction to the inadequate Canadian fortifications. Most of the battalions guarding the hillside would be nearly annihilated. Once the shelling stopped, the remains of the Canadian line were then victimized by the explosion of four German mines near the front.[120] Henceforth, there were little to no Canadian held positions left to resist the oncoming Germans. By the early afternoon, the Germans were successful in ridding the Canadians and capturing Mount Sorrel for themselves. The 3rd Division was left shattered and the need to recapture was imminent. This essay will aim

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[118] Gerald W.L. Nicholson. "The St. Eloi Craters and Mount Sorrel, 1916," in *Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919 Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2015), 148.

[119] "Canadian Corps General Staff War Diary June 1916," (Library and Archives Canada), 5.

[120] D.J. Goodspeed, *The Road Past Vimy: The Canadian Corps 1914-1918* (Toronto: General Paperbacks, 1987), 60.

to explore the reasons why the Canadians were unsuccessful during the initial stages of the battle of Mount Sorrel.

Foremost, the first element to consider that was not in favour of the Canadians was the weather and topography at Mount Sorrel. Most of the trench lines in the Salient were once agricultural and forested lands. Before the war, the region of Mount Sorrel was a largely wooded and rugged area. Consequently, the past year of stalemate and constant shelling transformed the region into a war zone where most of the vegetation was now demolished. Accordingly, the previous winter of 1915-16 was especially a wet one. This added an awfully muddy consistency to the already ravaged land. The soldiers on this front described the land of Mount Sorrel to have the same consistency as cream cheese.[121] Therefore, the Canadian soldiers of the 3rd Division were forced to defend a land which was nearly inhabitable. On top of this, the Canadian trenches were located on the rocky hillside. Thus, it was extremely difficult to establish well fortified defences in order to properly guard Mount Sorrel. Since it was challenging to dig in such harsh areas, the Canadians built many revetted breastworks.[122] These were temporary fortifications constructed of fallen logs or other materials. As a result, soldiers were very exposed since these positions were only accessible from above ground. Once the shelling began, these reinforcements were mostly obliterated and many Canadian soldiers were left vulnerable to the German onslaught.

Additionally, the weather in the days leading up and during the battle would play a large role in the outcome. During the several previous days before June 2, the weather was dreadful at the salient. Heavy rain not only created poor living conditions in the trenches, but it also played a

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[121] Andrew Godefroy, "Clash of Wills: The Canadian Struggle for Mount Sorrel, 2 June 1916," in *Fortune Favours the Brave Tales of Courage and Tenacity in Canadian Military History, by Bernd Horn*, (Toronto, Ontario: Dundurn Press, 2009), 178.
[122] Godefroy, "Clash of Wills: The Canadian Struggle for Mount Sorrel, 2 June 1916," 180.

large role in hampering Canadian intelligence. The constant rain fall created poor visibility conditions which prevented both assailants from discovering what either side was doing. During these several days, Canadian intelligence was incapable of benefitting from reconnaissance tactics such as flyovers. Thus, the Canadians at Mount Sorrel did not have sufficient means of uncovering information on the enemy. Nevertheless, on June 1, the weather was described to be one of the most unusual clear days that the occupants of the front had in a while.[123] Although the weather on the day before the attack was pleasant for the soldiers in the field, it was not the same case for the men in the skies. Royal Air Force (RAF) flyover missions done on this day reported that it was too hazy.[124] Therefore, survey missions done on the one decent day leading up to the battle were still not able to uncover any signs of the German planned assault.

Lastly, weather and topography would have a large role, even after the German capture of Mount Sorrel on 2 June. For the Canadians, they were incapable of launching any sort of counter-attacks after 3 June because of the weather. From the 3 to the 6 June 1916 specifically, both sides remained dug in due to high winds and rain.[125] Thus, the weather would also play a major part in delaying any sort of earlier recapture attempts. For the Germans, they too suffered from the weather and terrain on Mount Sorrel. Once they took over their new position, it was nearly impossible for them to create new defences. Since the old fortifications were mostly destroyed by their own artillery, they needed to construct new ones. Many of the German defences would be formed out of shell holes and craters since it was nearly impossible to dig

[123] S. G. Bennett, *The 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles, 1914-1919* (Toronto: Murray Print, 1926), 18.
[124] Edmonds, *Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1916. Vol. 1,* 230.
[125] Tim Cook, *Canadians Fighting the Great War. 1914-1916.* Vol. 1 (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007), 369.

trenches in the deep mud and hillside of Mount Sorrel.[126] This supplements the notion of how difficult it was to defend the position. Under these many circumstances, before and during the battle of Mount Sorrel, it is possible to regard just how difficult it was for the Canadians. Without even integrating the German assault, the climate and terrain disfavoured the Canadians at Mount Sorrel.

Furthermore, another element that led to the defeat of the Canadians on 2 June 1916 was the exceptional innovations in preparations and war tactics made by the German forces. For as many as six weeks before the beginning of June, German 26th and 27th Infantry Divisions from the 13th Württemberg Corps were stealthily preparing for an attack.[127] The most important aspect of the German planning was the precautions taken in secrecy. The Germans believed that an unknown offensive would be their best chance for success on the strategic location. One of the first ways the Germans prevented Canadian awareness of an attack was by not bringing up any reinforcements for the battle. During the war, a key indicator of an upcoming offensive was the mass-movement of troops to the front. In this case, the Germans never called upon any special troops and their account reveals that they decided to only carry out the assault with the men they had already there.[128]

Another significant aspect of the German planning was their rehearsal and preparations made in the weeks before the offensive. The Württemberg Corps was already very well trained in manning field artillery, but did not have the experience of taking over the hillside. Therefore, they began training their men for the specific assault. For example, On 3 May 1916, the RAF reported that there were two lines that resembled trenches near Menin Road in the German held

[126] Edmonds, 242.
[127] Nicholson, "The St. Eloi Craters and Mount Sorrel, 1916," 148.
[128] Edmonds, 243.

region. It would later be known that the German 26th Infantry Division had in fact dug 18 to 19 trenches that resembled the British line in order to practice their intended assault.[129] In addition, three weeks before the battle, Canadian patrols reported that the enemy was potentially creating saps and pushing out their lines further into No-Man's Land.[130] There were several instances like these that demonstrated that the Germans were planning for an attack, but there was never a definite indication that it was going to happen so soon. In fact, the Canadians even developed countermeasures such as creating counter-saps and machine gun emplacements in the event of an offensive.[131] Therefore, the secret preparations and rehearsals that the German troops were undergoing were benefitting the likelihood of their success.

Correspondingly, the German attack of Mount Sorrel demonstrated a remarkable siege warfare campaign. The attack was well planned and exceptionally coordinated. The Canadian position at Mount Sorrel was flattened, especially because of the constant storming of artillery, mines, and assaults.[132] Although this is valid, the management and measures taken by the Germans to make the onslaught successful were just as impressive. The days leading up to 2 June were some of the most essential. The Germans were able to keep the secrecy of their plans well hidden. For instance, the batteries were only brought forward a few nights before the attack in order to conceal their artillery from the enemy. Since both fronts were extremely near each other, straw was placed on the wheels to conceal the noise of the advancing guns.[133] Likewise, on the night before the offensive, German troops moved up to the new lines and remained hidden

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[129] Ibid., 230
[130] Ibid.,
[131] Bennett, *The 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles, 1914-1919*, 18.
[132] Bill Rawling, *Surviving Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps, 1914-1918* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 62.
[133] Godefroy, 186.

throughout the night until morning.[134] They did this to conceal the maneuvering troops and to send wire cutting teams to eliminate any preliminary barricades. Both of these examples demonstrate the great precautions the Germans went to in order to keep the attack secret and most effective.

Further German measures were successful during the assault. After the four hour shelling, the German troops rose from their trenches and advanced to the Canadian lines. The striking part about this was how well prepared the German soldiers really were at taking over the hillside. The first wave of Germans carried grenades and wire cutters.[135] They were prepared to face any remaining machine gun nest or barbed wire barricades in their advance. Also, the Germans went to the Canadian position very well prepared to set up new defences. It was common for many of the soldiers to carry shovels on their backs while they assaulted. In one case, Lieutenant John Harvey Douglas from the 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles who was captured at Mont Sorrel, wrote that the Germans began building trenches upon their arrival at the Canadian front. He remembered how the Germans were digging communication trenches and creating new defence systems out of wood.[136] His memory of the battle for Mount Sorrel demonstrates just how organized the Germans were in taking control and establishing a position. In summary, it would be extremely unfair to not credit all of these exceptional German performances for their major role in the outcome of Mont Sorrel.

Lastly, during the time of the attack, the Canadians suffered many series of misfortunate events which led them to have devastating losses. One of these unfortunate cases was the absence of leaders. During the early stages of the battle, many valuable figures would lose their

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[134] Edmonds, 244.
[135] Edmonds, 232.
[136] John Harvey Douglas, *Captured: Sixteen Months as a Prisoner of War* (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1918) 42.

lives. For example, in the early morning of 2 June, Major-General Mercer, commander of the 3rd Division, and Brigade General Williams, commander of the 8th Brigade, set out to inspect the front lines near Tor Top and Mount Sorrel. Just as they reached the trenches of the 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles (C.M.R.), the German artillery erupted and bombarded the area.[137] Neither men would return from the front line. Major-General Mercer would die on the front and Brigade-General Williams would be eventually captured by the German forces seizing the position. For many hours the 3rd Division and the 8th Brigade would be leaderless during the German raid.[138] From a senior level, the Canadians at Mount Sorrel would be disorganization and disadvantaged while they suffered from the unavailability of high ranking officials.

Also, the Canadians would be deprived of regimental leaders. For instance, the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (P.P.C.L.I.) was stationed on the right flank of the enemy near Sanctuary Wood. The German assault would cost the P.P.C.L.I. more than 400 casualties, including their own commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel H.C. Buller.[139] Another example of this was with the slaughter of the Canadian Mounted Rifles. The 4th C.M.R.'s were completely obliterated. There was nearly an 89% casualty with only three surviving officers from the previous twenty-two. Like so, the 1st and 5th C.M.R.'s both lost their commanding officers and also suffered heavy casualties.[140] Both of these regiments fought-on heroically during the barrage, but ultimately could not hold off the Germans from capturing Mount Sorrel. The loss of many commanders on this day is not the outright reason for defeat, but it is a notion which demonstrates a serious detriment on the Canadian lines. Therefore, the absence of divisional,

[137] Nicholson, 149.
[138] Ibid.,
[139] Ibid., 150.
[140] Bennett, 20.

brigade and regimental commanders would paralyze any Canadian chances at reorganizing and fighting the advancing Germans.

Moreover, another great obstacle that the Canadians had to face throughout the battle was the impairment of their communications lines. The four hour artillery bombardment decimated the Canadian trenches, but would also ravage any communication lines. Shortly after the end of the barrage, it was revealed that the telephone lines were cut and the communication trenches were destroyed. In consequence, the Canadian position was left isolated from the of the rest of the Corps. Once notice of the assault came to the commander of the Canadian Corps, Lieutenant-General Julian Byng, he sent out an order for an immediate counter-attack. The BEF needed to ensure that the Germans did not push through the Ypres Salient. The counter-attack ordered would be the largest Canadian one to date in the war with the 7th, 10th, 14th, 15th, 49th and 60th Battalions taking charge.[141] Essentially, the counter-attack would result in failure because of the ill-planning and the lack of communication. Before the counter-offensive could take action, there were several delays and confusions that postponed it until the following morning of 3 June. The combination of not knowing where the remaining men were on the front and not being able to communicate with them, contributed to the uncoordinated failed attack. Also, since the counterstrike was delayed until the morning of 3 June, the Canadians were disadvantaged by "attacking over the open in daylight."[142] Thus, the lack of information on the enemy and the costly delays, the assailants and the supporting artillery were not successful in reclaiming Mount Sorrel on 3 June 1916.

In addition, on top of the deficient leaders and failed communications, one of the greatest adversities of the battle that the Canadians faced was not having enough supporting artillery. As

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[141] Cook, *Canadians Fighting the Great War. 1914-1916*, 358.
[142] "Canadian Corps General Staff War Diary June 1916," (Library and Archives Canada), 6.

previously stated, the Allies were preparing for a large-scale offensive in the Somme. Hence, much of the heavy firepower needed for the future campaign was moved south.[143] This resulted in the weakening of the Canadian sector in its artillery capabilities. Therefore, the Canadians lacked in sufficient firepower at the time of the German attack. In the end, the Canadians were significantly impaired in the components of leadership, communication and artillery.

In conclusion, it is evident that the Canadians at Mount Sorrel were undeniably destined for defeat on 2 June 1916. The weather leading up to the battle along with the topography of Mount Sorrel heavily impaired the Canadians from the beginning. Also, the war tactics used by Germans at Mount Sorrel before and during the battle, were impeccable and put the Canadians at a major disadvantage. Finally, factors such as the absence of communication, the loss of authority figures and the shortage of artillery all opposed any chance of Canadian victory. It is clear that the misconception about the Canadian loss of Mount Sorrel is not solely due to their lack of qualifications. In fact, there are numerous supporting factors which prove that the Canadians were never at an advantage to successfully restrain the Germans. Therefore, the Canadians at Mount Sorrel should be viewed in a different notion that deviates from past beliefs.

Epilogue

After the devastated blow, the Canadians needed to regroup and regain their position at Mount Sorrel. Several limited counter-attacks were conducted, but never successful. For several days, the Canadians in the salient were postponed from any large-scale offensives due to the

[143] Cook, 349.

harsh weather. Once the weather cleared, the arrangements to reclaim Mount Sorrel were put in place. The commander of the BEF, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, wanted to expel the Germans from their position, but in view of the offensive at the Somme, he did not want to divert any more men.[144] Thus, he decided to transport many guns to the front, it was the largest amount of battery employed on such a narrow front to date. There were 218 pieces of artillery, including 116 eighteen pound guns, were brought to the Canadian sector.[145] The main task was essentially to do the same as the Germans did to them. They needed to pound the hill with a constant barrage in order to wipe out their defences and support lines. On 8 June, the 6th Squadron was able to capture good photographs of the German positions and then the shelling began.[146] For nearly ten hours straight on 12 June, almost every Canadian gun bombarded the German sectors. The majority of the German lines were shattered and offered little resistance to the forthcoming Canadians. In virtually one hour, the assault was over and the 3rd Battalion had recaptured possession of Mount Sorrel.

In total, from the 2 to 14 June 1916, the Canadians lost over 8,000 men and the Germans suffered 5,755 casualties.[147] Although, the recapture of the lost land did not justify the amount of Canadian casualties, it did in fact have a large role in the future effects of the war. It was especially important for the morale of the men who had suffered dearly for months.[148] Mount Sorrel would be the first Canadian victory they had seen in a significant amount of time. In addition, it demonstrated how quickly the Canadians were able to regroup and learn form their defeat. At Mount Sorrel, the Canadians would recognize the importance of aerial observation in

[144] Nicholson, 151.
[145] Ibid.,
[146] Edmonds, 240.
[147] Nicholson, 151.
[148] Goodspeed, 62.

relation with artillery operations.[149] Also, the Canadians learned how important it was to keep communication ties and resources well equipped. Thus, the battle for Mount Sorrel would go on to be an important victory and lesson for the Canadian Corps. For the rest of the summer, the Canadians stayed in the Ypres Salient waiting for the eventual large offensive in the Somme.

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Defecting Chieu Hoi: A Psychological Warfare Analysis

Jade Dejong

Dear Mom:

I miss so much to be away from you. I also miss my brothers, sisters, uncles, and aunts. However, I have to make the sacrifice of my life for the [country's] future.[150]

These are the words written in a personal journal left on the battlefield by Mai Van Hung. Van Hung was a member of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). Though from a private diary, these are thoughts and emotions that were shared among thousands of

[150] Lanning, Michael Lee., and Dan Cragg. Inside the VC and the NVA: The Real Story of North Vietnams Armed Forces. College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2008.

Vietnamese soldiers during the Vietnam War. The modern historiography on the Vietnam War paints a narrative of de-humanized guerrilla "jungle" fighters that emphasize America's defeat. The bottom line is that these soldiers were more than just jungle fighters. Each fighter is an individual, a person that shares the same hopes and dreams of any other, a want for a better future and a Vietnam that they can be proud of. Various factors motivated the Vietnamese to fight and as this paper will demonstrate, motivations that pushed the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) to defect to the Government of Vietnam (GVN).

Historiography

The Vietnam War has been a highly controversial topic in American history. Perceptions and historical assessments of the Vietnam War highly expressed and presented among modern historiography. The bulk of the historiography surrounding the Vietnam War discusses the U.S. policy for the duration of the war effort. Up until the early 1970s, the historiography followed critiques and reflections about Vietnam and United States Policy. In an influential book from 1979, The Irony of Vietnam: The System worked, Historians Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts explored and identified the main explanations about the war in this period.[151] The explanations about United States policy at this time varied in political ideologies, but all discussed the concept surrounding America's failed intervention in Vietnam. These ideologies ranged from imperialistic ideas to domestic politics as well as international politics. The idea that the United States failed in its intervention in Vietnam dominated the focus of Vietnam War historiography. From this focused scholarship, two main explanations emerged. The first explanation surrounds the Vietnam War as an

[151] Gelb, Leslie H., and Richard K. Betts. *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016.

avoidable tragedy. In this way, the United States government made policy decisions that cost them their victory. This explanation overestimates the importance that the American Government had to Vietnam. The ideology surrounded the outcome of the war. If the United States government recognized and appreciated the popular appeal of nationalism within Vietnam as well as the limits of the power that the American government indeed possessed, the outcome would have changed.[152] This view is one of the dominant interpretations of the Vietnam War. This view is explored in works from historians like George C. Herring, Stanley Karnow, Gary R. Hess and William I. Duiker.[153] These authors, even including Robert S. McNamara interpret the Vietnam War as an avoidable tragedy. A different target changed the future outcome, and if the American government had handled things differently than they typically adapted to in their daily lives. [154]

The second approach follows an excellent critique of the United States. The approach explores that if the United States did not feel the need to exert its power over the world in terms of capitalist systems, then the intervention of Indochina would not have been so necessary. The crisis would not have been as large scale if not for the United States' drive for control "Anatomy of a War" from Gabriel Kolko explores this notion.[155]

Following the 1980s, the critical thoughts surrounding the United States had changed gears. There then, were veterans of the Vietnam War that came forward to critique tactics

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[152] Gelb, Leslie H., and Richard K. Betts. *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016.
[153] Gelb, Leslie H., and Richard K. Betts. The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016.
[154] Gelb, Leslie H., and Richard K. Betts. The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016.
[155] Michael Lee Lanning., and Dan Cragg. *Inside the VC and the NVA: The Real Story of North Vietnams Armed Forces*. College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2008.

and debate which tactics would have succeeded with different execution. It was from there that there were various critiques about the Vietnam War in tactics and campaigns and psychological warfare. The psychological warfare and oral history aspect of the Vietnam historiography is the focus of this paper.

In recent historiography as mentioned, the focus of America's defeat began to lessen. As this was the primary focus for so long, authors such as Michael Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg began to alter this in their book "Inside the VC and the NVA, The Real Story of North Vietnam's Armed Forces."[156] The Vietnam War is much studied but often studied in certain divisions. The historiography surrounding the Vietnam War as told by the authors with over six years of 'boots on the ground' experience, has divided itself into ideas of thought based on victory, military tactics, and an American defeat. The main purpose for many great pieces in historiography explores how Americans lost the Vietnam War, and what outcomes would change the defeat into victory. Cragg and Lanning seek to provide a new addition to the historiography. The authors not only place their arguments within the greater historiography of the Vietnam War but explore the Vietnam War through analysis of the Communist victory.[157] More specifically, in contrast to why America was defeated in the Vietnam War, this insightful and unique read places the spotlight upon the Vietnamese victors. Even though minor critiques, Lanning and Cragg's *Real Story* is a brilliantly unique perspective on one of

[156]Carrier, J. M., and C. A. H. Thomson. Viet Cong Motivation and Morale: The Special Case of Chieu Hoi. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publishing, 1967.

[157] Michael Lee Lanning., and Dan Cragg. *Inside the VC and the NVA: The Real Story of North Vietnams Armed Forces*. College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2008.

America's most controversial wars, eloquently written within the context of both the Vietnamese and American soldiers fighting in a brutal war where no one wins.[158]

Lanning and Cragg argue that it was the dedication as well as the determination that the Vietnam soldiers possessed that gave Vietnam the victory. The book utilizes interviews, personal diaries, letters and documents to demonstrate the realities that existed behind the victory. The chapters brilliantly take all the different factors of the Vietnamese soldiers into consideration such as recruiting, training, history, tactics, fighting ability and equipment to explain how the Vietnamese soldiers outlasted the American soldiers.[159]

One of the incredibly fascinating aspects of the writing was the personal touch that was added to the book. Before the writing commences, the authors take time to explain their connection to the Vietnam War. The authors included their relationship to their argument, and how that personally affected them. After writing the book, there is an added chapter that explores the hardships that the authors endured while writing, and how that affected the outcome of the book. The authors were both serving the United States during the Vietnam War, and so they were conditioned to think and understand the Vietnam War in the context of the enemy. This made creating the piece without too much burden of personal perspective quite tricky. The great part about this book though was the gained respect that could be gained throughout the pages. During the war, the enemy would become entirely faceless, and treated as less human; this then, made the Vietnamese people more comfortable with killing. In this way, the memories that the soldiers had contradicted their new understanding that the

[158] Michael Lee Lanning., and Dan Cragg. *Inside the VC and the NVA: The Real Story of North Vietnams Armed Forces*. College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2008.
[159] Michael Lee Lanning., and Dan Cragg. *Inside the VC and the NVA: The Real Story of North Vietnams Armed Forces*. College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2008.

Vietnamese soldiers had much in common with the American soldiers. It was due to this phenomenon, that Lanning and Cragg strip down the preconceived notions about the enemy sub-human, and turn the Vietnamese soldiers into realistic and understandable soldiers who were trying to serve for the cause that would positively benefit their life, just as the American soldiers did. By the end of the eloquent read, the Vietnamese enemy was no different from the American enemy; the only difference was that even though America remained unchanged from defeat, Vietnam never won in peace either. Americans claim to experience betrayal, but never saw betrayed like the men of Hanoi.[160]

This period is when the historiography began to touch on the experiences that were felt by the Vietnamese soldiers rather than just the Americans. As two parties are involved in the Vietnam War, the war demands analysis from both sides. Authors such as Lanning and Cragg used documents and experiences to explain what the Vietnamese underwent throughout the war and understand the war from the side that won, rather than focusing on the defeat.[161]

In focusing on the Vietnamese, one can gain much information that can be used for psychological warfare. This can be very successful and often understood that if appropriately used, this type of warfare can have a significant influence on the outcome of the war. Psychological warfare became a great attribute in modern war. In order to gather information for successful psychological warfare, it is imperative to gain a deeper understanding of the enemy. Once a deeper understanding of the enemy is obtained, then psychological

[160] Michael Lee Lanning., and Dan Cragg. *Inside the VC and the NVA: The Real Story of North Vietnams Armed Forces*. College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2008.
[161] Long, Austin, On ''Other War'': Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006.

operations, including propaganda can be used to influence the behaviour, attitudes, and opinions of the opposition.[162] It is the use of psychological warfare that the Chieu Hoi campaign fulfilled. The United States created the most extensive psychological warfare operation campaign for the entirety of the Vietnam War. In this open arms program, the American government launched the program with the Government of Vietnam in 1963. In terms of the American government, the idea was not only to utilize propaganda to have Vietnamese soldiers defect to PAVN but to interview the defectors to understand and determine the main reasons for defecting in order to increase the rate of defectors. If the propaganda could shape the main focuses for defecting, there would be a significantly higher amount of defectors. This, in turn, weakens the communist cause through the loss of much military personnel and civilian support. With the success of these intentions, the National Liberation Front would weaken, and the Government of Vietnam would strengthen. The strengthened government of Vietnam would increase the chances of a successful war for the United States.

The Chieu Hoi program was not an easy task. The program, translated as the "Open Arms' program, was ultimately a defection program. The program gave the People's Army of Vietnam, the "alternative to the hardships and deprivations of guerilla life, political pardon, and even a livelihood."[163] The Vietnamese peoples throughout history, do not 'join' easily.[164] The way to gain recruits was through an intense persuasion of propaganda, and

[162] Carrier, J. M., and C. A. H. Thomson. Viet Cong Motivation and Morale: The Special Case of Chieu Hoi. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publishing, 1967.

[163] Koch, J. A. The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1973.
[164] Koch, J. A. The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1973.

drafts.[165] The program offered opportunities for the defeated enemy to leave the improper guerrilla fighting conditions, as well as proper training and a political pardon.[166] The American government utilized this to its advantage when rallying the enemy. [167] The Chieu Hoi program had great importance within the Vietnam War. Not only was the Chieu Hoi program the reason for a great reduction in Viet Cong manpower, but it also demonstrates the psychological aspects of war and a greater understanding of fight motivations. Historians speculate that the Chieu Hoi program was a successful tactic of psychological warfare that would have proven more successful when utilized alongside other techniques and stronger governmental assistance. The Chieu Hoi program was not only a military tactic but a psychological operation. Psychological operations are a new construction but have existed for thousands of years. Psychological warfare includes the use of propaganda and psychological methods to influence opposition groups.[168]

As found in most of the research, the rallying was greatly personal. The motives for defecting to the People's Army of Vietnam were due to the poor conditions of life in the National Liberation Front, unfortunate financial situations, family concerns as well as the uncertainty about the future conditions of Vietnam.[169]

Methodology

[165]Carrier, J. M., and C. A. H. Thomson. Viet Cong Motivation and Morale: The Special Case of Chieu Hoi. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publishing, 1967.

[166] Koch, J. A. The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1973.
[167] Koch, J. A. The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1973.
[168] Kellen, Konrad, Conversations with Enemy Soldiers in Late 1968/Early 1969: A Study of Motivation and Morale. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1970.
[169] Carrier, J. M., and C. A. H. Thomson. Viet Cong Motivation and Morale: The Special Case of Chieu Hoi. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publishing, 1967.

The principal methodology for this project revolves around the principle evidence base for the research project on the Chieu Hoi initiative are interviews conducted by the American government. These interviews were conducted as part of the South Vietnamese initiative to encourage defection from the National Liberation Front (otherwise known as the Vietcong). This collection of interviews includes sixty-one interviews from various detainees. The series was noted to be the investigation of the motivations of defectors and the factors considered to encourage their defection. The interviews are a sample all conducted out of the Dinh Tuong province in South Vietnam. Each interview commences with details of the defector interviewed. The interview includes their category, position as well as details about their status, and military information in the form of a questionnaire.

In the interview, there was an average of seventy to ninety questions given. The questions ranged from what the living conditions were previous to defecting to known family information. The questions are quite in-depth and cover various perspectives from the conditions previous to defecting, up to the opinions and perspectives of the villagers. There were multiple different points of view surrounding defecting and the many different ideologies behind rallying.

The research methods will consist of analyzing many different primary sources, and comparing research from the RAND such as letters, diaries, personal documents, and interviews. It is the intention to use secondary sources to build on knowledge and understanding. The secondary sources will be a background for evidence but mostly comprised of primary source documents. Even though the project will have a narrowed focus, and create a small challenge within the historiography and explore the rallying

rationale thoroughly to understand the enemy thought better. The interviews not only broaden one's understanding but has the opportunity to provide a fresh perspective on modern discourse.[170]

Chapter 1 – Poor Conditions in the National Liberation Front

The reality to the Open Arms program is that most of the defectors including the ones in the RAND corporation interviews were peasants. The peasants in Vietnam have been used to a typical form of authority. The peasants became 'comfortable' in their lifestyle. As the peasants were typically comfortable receiving orders and being appreciative of the little given to them, joining the National Liberation Front was an option to have a say in their lives and join the army. Once there was an option to choose the conditions that best suited the individual through the Chieu Hoi program, Vietnamese soldiers began to choose the People's Army of Vietnam.[171] As the war progressed, the conditions in the National Liberation Front worsened. For starters, the peasants were captured and arrested if they refused to join the army. The army would also make serious threats against either the peasant, their family or their belongings if they failed to join. In this way, there would be possible penalties of the forced draft to the Army Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), 'harassed by the Government of Vietnam' (GVN), or even arrested.[172]

The National Liberation Front even went so far as instructing those that succeeded in killing a returnee or one who has rallied to the different cause would become a member of the Order of the Valiant Knights, an honour for those that have killed at least ten Vietnamese

[170] Long, Austin, On ''Other War'': Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006.
[171] Koch, J. A. The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1973.
[172] Koch, J. A. The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1973.

and American soldiers.[173] The "honour" was poor morale to set for the soldiers on the front as it does not promote any proper conditions for the soldiers, and it just demonstrates that the soldiers are easily replaceable. The replaceability promotes the de-humanization of the soldiers and gives rallying to the American side easier.[174]

Secondly, the tempo of the military operations in the National Liberation Front was significantly faster than that of the opposition. The tempo adds much pressure to the soldiers and often removes the ability for the rallier to escape control. As the rallies were constantly in motion, this made it very difficult to maintain proper conditions.[175] The soldiers experienced persistent illness and injury as well as poor and inadequate food. This unhealthy environment greatly affected soldiers. The third detainee described the cadres as greatly feared and motivated by hatred. "No one dared to refuse the front." [176] Defector interviewee 4 expressed that "the hardships in the Front's Life were numerous: food was inadequate; I ate rice with soya sauce; I received no salary."[177] As many feared the cadres, there were not many limits on how they would treat the peoples. As long as the soldiers remained fed, the orders were expected to be followed and respected.

[173] Koch, J. A. The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1973.
[174] Koch, J. A. The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1973.
[175] Dinh Tuong Defector 1-60, interviewed by the RAND Corporation.Dinh Tuong Province, South Vietnam. May 1965.
[176] Dinh Tuong Defector 1-60, interviewed by the RAND Corporation.Dinh Tuong Province, South Vietnam. May 1965.
[177] Dinh Tuong Defector 1-60, interviewed by the RAND Corporation.Dinh Tuong Province, South Vietnam. May 196 Long, Austin, On ''Other War'': Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006. 5.

The conditions while working for the National Liberation Front had social implications. Often, the conditions forced restrictions on personal freedoms.[178] The conditions included restrictions on marriage and make additions to a family. The idea was that the soldier was to be entirely concentrated on the effort and not to be distracted on personal freedoms. The other reasoning behind this was constant movement. It was impossible to focus on the personal aspects of life when no one stays in one place for long.[179]

Thirdly, the cadres placed great control and close criticisms upon those serving in the Front. The cadres offered that those who served adequate food and pay; the problem was that this was not maintained. The front would promise the people that defectors would pay severely for their mistakes. They would be either sent away to canals to cultivate tea plants or even shot on the spot.

In comparison to the Chieu Hoi program, the conditions were fierce. The soldiers were exhausted, often sick and if not by ailment, sick for home. The constant movement also made it challenging to keep in contact with loved ones at home. Often, the American soldiers would find letters on the ground of the battlefield that expressed their deep love for their family, and their deep regrets for the possibility that they may not make it through their experience with the Front to come back home.[180]

Poor Financial Situations

[178] Long, Austin, On ''Other War'': Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006.
[179] Koch, J. A. The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1973.
[180] Inside the VC and the NVA, The Real Story of North Vietnam's Armed Forces."[180]

Another primary reason for defection involves financial struggles. As suggested earlier, those involved with the National Liberation Front were most commonly peasants. As their lower-class coins the term for peasants.[181] The peasants often came to serve the military as a viable option to make themselves a more significant income and pay any debts that they would have previously had as farmers or village workers. The front promised to provide adequate food and pay for joining. The problem was that often, the food was rice-based and did not provide adequate nutrition and as the war progressed, they lacked funds.[182]

As the fight continued, there were still many financial struggles, and the men would often go days without food. The men were not even guaranteed their land and resources upon returning as Vietnam was in shambles.[183] As the Vietnam economy was not in a place to allow peasants to improve their economic situations, it was then necessary to defect with the Chieu Hoi program. This program allowed for the peasants to not only have a career throughout the Vietnam War but to improve vocational training and to help find jobs for the returnees with a goal of 9,000 recruiters. The program not only promises the Vietnamese a way out of their financial struggles during the war but an answer to a future once the war has ended.[184]

With the poor conditions at the time, there was not much to look forward to, other than to focus on the future ahead and future without a financial struggle. It was not

[181] Dinh Tuong Defector 1-60, interviewed by the RAND Corporation.Dinh Tuong Province, South Vietnam. May 1965.
[182] Dinh Tuong Defector 1-60, interviewed by the RAND Corporation.Dinh Tuong Province, South Vietnam. May 1965.
[183] Dinh Tuong Defector 1-60, interviewed by the RAND Corporation.Dinh Tuong Province, South Vietnam. May 1965.
[184] Dinh Tuong Defector 1-60, interviewed by the RAND Corporation.Dinh Tuong Province, South Vietnam. May 1965.

necessarily right that the Vietnamese searched for life beyond farming. Often, farming was all that they knew. However, often farming was quite stressful. There could be seasons where the farmers would lose many crops due to weather or poor growing seasons. In this way, the farmers would not be able to afford the taxes and all that they would owe to the government.[185]

One of the most significant issues concerning defecting to the Chieu Hoi program was fear. Those in the Front were so afraid of the consequences that would ensue after defecting to the new program. Not only were they afraid to get shot or killed, but they were afraid to be shamed and no longer allowed to come back to their villages. Their villages were significant as they not only housed their families and their belongings, but a man wishes to leave something for their children to be proud of them.[186] If shamed from their villages, they will lose the opportunity to raise their children and the life that they worked so hard to build. [187]

Family Concerns

Often family was a massive motivator for defecting to the Chieu Hoi program. Family and morality were critical to the Vietnamese. A majority of those that were interviewed by the American Government had different family concerns that contributed to the rally. Some of the defectors mentioned that their wives had cheated on them and had recently suffered a

[185] Dinh Tuong Defector 1-60, interviewed by the RAND Corporation.Dinh Tuong Province, South Vietnam. May 1965.

[186] Koch, J. A. The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1973.
[187] Dinh Tuong Defector 1-60, interviewed by the RAND Corporation.Dinh Tuong Province, South Vietnam. May 1965.

divorce. The divorce brought much trauma that forced them to want to change from their previous life. The divorce put significant stress on more than just their emotions. The loss of a spouse meant less income to support children along with themselves.[188]

Occasionally, the family concerns were not due to marital problems, but regarding children. If the children were sick or there was not enough money to provide for the family, the father then signed up for the National Liberation Front to make enough money to support the family and to ensure the safety and security of his loved ones.[189]

Another significant hazard in regards to the family is the risk of getting caught in the defecting process. Often, the repercussions for getting caught is that the family would pay. Either they would be forced to sign up or face the consequences. A further option would be to send them away to take a course that would teach them the values of Vietnam in which the National Liberation Front wished to build.[190]

The Future of Vietnam

One of the biggest reasons for rallying to the Chieu Hoi program was for the hopes of a more significant Vietnam. Firstly, the soldiers believed in the tactics and the techniques that were used by the United States. Many of the Vietnamese heard of the United States.[191] Though America was talked about quite poorly by the National Liberation Front, many

[188] Pye, Lucian W. RM-4864-ISA/ARPA, Observations on the Chieu Hoi Program. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, January 1966.
[189] Koch, J. A. The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1973.
[190] Dinh Tuong Defector 1-60, interviewed by the RAND Corporation.Dinh Tuong Province, South Vietnam. May 1965.
[191] Dinh Tuong Defector 1-60, interviewed by the RAND Corporation.Dinh Tuong Province, South Vietnam. May 1965.

believed that the United States was a great opportunity for Vietnam to work in a better, liberated manner.[192] The National Liberation Front claimed to have a political push for a better Vietnam and its political independence. As there were few other options at the time, the Vietnamese people sought to sign up for the National Liberation Front. The issue is, even though the political party was pushing for independence, it does not mean that particular Vietnam would be the optimal freedom for the people. Though Vietnam would be 'free' of its hold from the people that the Vietnamese held responsible for the start of the Vietnam war, the National Liberation Front was not even holding up their deals throughout the war, let alone afterward.[193]

The Chieu Hoi program made many promises to the Vietnamese people in regard to the future. The program ensured job stability, the promise of their land and even education. The program will lead to stronger prosperity for future Vietnamese allowing for future governmental candidates and a society that does not rely so heavily on its peasantry population. It is the push for a better life that many soldiers push to fight and win wars. This understanding amplified for the Vietnamese who have been living in poor social conditions and economic conditions throughout the war and dream of a place where they can safely and securely raise families.

Even though the National Liberation Front was much opposed to the Chieu Hoi program and punished defectors, the program demonstrated to the Vietnamese that there were more options than just accepting orders and living in a state of fear. As they were

[192] Koch, J. A. The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1973.
[193] Koch, J. A. The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1973.

already fighting a war, they might as well fight for a cause that they strongly believed in. Not all members of the National Liberation Front defected to the Chieu Hoi program, but among the defectors, the most common rationale is for a peaceful, free Vietnam.

Conclusion

The motives for defecting to the People's Army of Vietnam were due to the poor conditions of life in the National Liberation Front, unfortunate financial situations, family concerns as well as the uncertainty about the future conditions of Vietnam.[194]

The Chieu Hoi Program was often referred to as a failure as the Vietnam War did not succeed in the United States government. This psychological warfare program decreased the National Liberation Front's workforce by almost 195,000 fighters. This program was not efficient on its own. However, psychological warfare programs are rarely successful without the proper aid of the rest of the war effort.[195]

A significant issue lay in the lack of funding from the government.[196] Without proper government funding, the program could not offer enough education programs to integrate the Vietnamese successfully. Without this success with the program, there were significantly

[194] Carrier, J. M., and C. A. H. Thomson. Viet Cong Motivation and Morale: The Special Case of Chieu Hoi. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publishing, 1967.
[195] Pye, Lucian W. RM-4864-ISA/ARPA, Observations on the Chieu Hoi Program. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, January 1966.
[196] Carrier, J. M., and C. A. H. Thomson. Viet Cong Motivation and Morale: The Special Case of Chieu Hoi. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publishing, 1967.

fewer defectors, causing the program to fall through. Companies such as the RAND Corporation often expressed that with better-organized spending and backing from the South Vietnamese, the program could have been very successful at defecting the National Liberation Front. This is not to say though that the Chieu Hoi program alone could win the Vietnam War. It was one part of a more significant effort to end the conflict and had little effect on the North Vietnamese.

Though this is a hugely complex issue regarding the discussion of program success, the Chieu Hoi program offers specific and in-depth information surrounding enemy defectors. Through the Chieu Hoi program, one can understand the reasonings for defecting to the opposition in the Vietnam War. Though relevant to modern warfare is less prominent in historiography. Though covered thoroughly by the RAND Corporation, the more significant historiography does not place substantial importance on psychological warfare. The prominence includes the successes of the Vietnam War.[197] Though the outcome of the war was a defeat, the campaign was successful and contained significant information that will continue to support modern psychological warfare for years to come.

[197] Pye, Lucian W. RM-4864-ISA/ARPA, Observations on the Chieu Hoi Program. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, January 1966.

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Paying for Peace? The Origins of the Non-Resistant Relief Organization

Ryrie Dirksen

In the wake of the Military Service Act of 1917, Mennonites and Brethren in Christ denominations secured exemption through the formation of the Non-Resistant Relief Organization, also known as the NRRO. The Mennonites, along with Brethren in Christ denominations, have a historically rooted belief in pacifism, specifically non-resistance. While pacifism refers to a belief in non-violence and peaceful conflict resolution, non-resistance is the belief in not demonstrating physical resistance against an enemy.

When war broke out in 1914, Canada became involved when Great Britain had declared war on Germany. By 1917, what became known as World War I had yet to cease and there were increasing casualty rates. As an effort to recruit more soldiers into the Canadian Army, Prime Minister Robert Borden introduced the Military Service Act of 1917. After much debate, this Act became law in August 1917. The passing of this law meant that men aged 20-45 were to be called-up to engage in military service for the Canadian army. Although Mennonites and other pacifist denominations were technically considered part of the draft, they thought they would be granted exemption status based on their religious and individual belief in pacifism. This meant that Mennonites would be granted exemption status by acting as conscientious objectors. A conscientious objector is an individual who has been granted an exemption from being active in

military status on the grounds of religious freedom. The Non-Resistant Relief Organization (NRRO) was a fundraising organization that collected war relief funds as a form of gratitude toward the government for granting Mennonites exemption status in response to the Military Service Act of 1917.

This paper will examine the origins of the Non-Resistant Relief Organization (NRRO) and the role it played in its relationship to the Canadian government. Further, it will uncover the nature of the relationship between the Canadian government and minority religious groups in Canada, given the history of the NRRO.

This paper will argue that the formation of the NRRO in November 1917 revealed socio-political tensions between the Canadian government and minority religious groups in Canada through the use of the NRRO as a way to leverage exemption status. Specifically, this is seen through the formation and establishment of the NRRO, secular attitudes toward the NRRO, the role that faith played in achieving exemption from military service, the measures that had to be taken in order to secure exemption status, and the distribution of the relief fund.

On November 17, 1917 at Wideman Community Church in Markham, Ontario, L.J. Burkholder gathered together ten Mennonite and Brethren in Christ (Tunker) elders from non-resistant churches in Ontario. These non-resistant groups included Old Mennonites, the Brethren in Christ, and Mennonite Brethren in Christ, the Amish Mennonites, and Old –Order Mennonites.[198] These elders and churches were largely made up of Dutch, Swiss, and German Mennonites descent. Many of the members were first-generation Canadians. Representations of non-resistant bodies were brought together to discuss tangible ways to thank the Canadian

[198]Esther Ruth Epp. "The Origins of Mennonite Central Committee (Canada)." M.A. thesis, University of Manitoba, 1980: 16.

government for granting them exemption based on conscientious objector status. Although these non-resistant bodies expected exemption from military service, some were suspicious regarding the security of this exemption status. Going forth, these attendees decided to launch an unofficial investigation into the exemption matter.

On January 16, 1918, another meeting took place, which marked the official birth of the Non-Resistant Relief Organization (NRRO). The official goal of the NRRO was to establish a war relief fund that would be donated to the government as a form of gratitude for the enjoyment of exemption privileges. The early origin years of the NRRO were spent largely seeking details regarding the security of exemption status from the government. Due to the time spent on the clarification of exemption, collection for the relief fund began toward the end of 1918. In mid 1919, the NRRO relief fund at government request was distributed across relief organizations for people affected by the war in Europe.

Following the end of the First World War in 1919, the NRRO continued to collect funds to assist with famine relief in China and Russia. Additionally, the NRRO represented Russian Mennonites facing persecution in Russia in the 1920s, by helping lower the immigration ban for Mennonites that was in place due to Canada granting exemption status during the First World War. After assisting the Russian Mennonites, the NRRO was deactivated from 1934-1937.[199]

Scholarship regarding Canadian Mennonite history started to expand in the mid to late twentieth century into the twenty-first century. Although Canadian Mennonite scholarship can vary between regions and groups, certain areas lack research. One of these areas in Mennonite history is that of the Non-Resistant Relief Organization (NRRO). There has been increasing

[199] Esther Ruth Epp. "The Origins of Mennonite Central Committee (Canada)." M.A. thesis, University of Manitoba, 1980: 19.

research on its successor organization, the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), but its predecessor has not been widely researched. Due to the lack of scholarship on the NRRO, the historiographical framework is largely based on books and articles regarding the role of Canadian Mennonites in Canada as well as the way that religious groups have practiced pacifism and how pacifism has been viewed by the state. As a result, the historiographical framework for this paper has used the work of a few scholars, who specialize in these topics.

In order to thoroughly research and understand the history and role of the NRRO, it is necessary to examine the role of Mennonites in Canada. In the late twentieth century, Dr. Frank Epp was one of the leading Canadian Mennonite historians and was president of Conrad Grebel College in Waterloo, a post-secondary Mennonite institution. Frank Epp's book *Mennonites in Canada 1786-1920: The History of a Separate People*, argues that the history and experiences of Mennonites in Canada have become an indispensable part of Canada's identity as a whole.[200] To arrive at this conclusion, Epp highlights the cultural complexity that the Mennonites faced with war, military service, their pacifist beliefs, and the effects of this tension. In terms of pacifist beliefs, Epp states that those beliefs represented the division between minority groups and the majority Anglo-Saxon population in Canada. To study these ideas requires the reference and understanding of the NRRO. The NRRO fits into this framework, as it was a pivotal point for Mennonites. This is because the NRRO's purpose and actions demonstrated the culturally complex relationship between Mennonite beliefs, identity and Canadian nationalist pressures.

The study of the NRRO and their form of pacifism would not be thorough without having acknowledged the development and role of pacifism in European Mennonites, prior to certain

[200] Frank H. Epp, and Douglas Ratchford, *Mennonites in Canada, 1786-1920: The History of a Separate People*, Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1974.

immigration waves. Peter Brock, a pacifist historian, has written numerous books involving how pacifism has manifested in different regions of the world. His work *Pacifism in Europe till 1914,* argues how Christian pacifism, as an individual stance based on belief, has always existed and how it has formed and developed in different Christian groups in Europe until the Great War.[201] Similar to Frank Epp, Brock's chapters regarding Dutch and German Mennonites also illustrate the complexity of the relationship between church and state that can be emphasized because of pacifism. In terms of German Mennonites, he references the different exemption laws that existed in North America, which resulted in a mass immigration of Mennonites to North American in the nineteenth century.[202]

Contrary to conclusions made regarding the history and responses of Mennonites, pacifism, and war, historian Robynne Healey takes a different approach. Healey's essay, "Quakers, Mennonites, and the Great War" argues that the Great War was a turning point for Canadians Mennonites and Quakers because it marked an event in which these religious groups acted on their pacifist beliefs.[203] Her analysis of how the war was a catalyst for the emphasis in acting on non-resistance differs from other research and her analysis on the pacifist motivations in setting up the NRRO aid understanding how different Mennonite groups in Canada varied in their faith and beliefs regarding the meaning and actions associated with non-resistance and exemption.

Both Epp and Brock argue that pacifist beliefs highlighted the complexity of the relationship between the state and other minority religious groups. The examination of

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[201] Peter Brock, *Pacifism in Europe to 1914*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972.

[202] Ibid. , 435.

[203] Robynne Healey, *Canadian Churches and the First World War*, Edited by Gordon L. Heath, Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2014.

Mennonite immigration and North American exemption laws by Brock depicts how states viewed pacifist beliefs differently, and where Canada's stance on exemption was situated. This scholarship on Mennonite non-resistance and pacifism in Europe opens way for research regarding how the NRRO's exemption status was similar and different from that of European states historically. Further, the situation of Canada's military exemption for Mennonites sheds light on the historical pacifist beliefs and European roots of Mennonites involved in the NRRO. An examination solely focusing on the NRRO fills a gap within the study of Mennonites and pacifism in Canada.

The primary sources used for the research paper are from the Mennonite Archives of Ontario, specifically the digitized files of the Non-Resistant Relief Organization. These files were digitized because their original copies were becoming difficult to read. These sources will be highly useful within the paper because of detail and correspondence. First, the official documents of the NRRO contain every agenda of every meeting, which provides an immense amount of detail. This detail within the sources will allow the paper to answer historical research questions surrounding the development of the organization as well as the NRRO's changing perspectives toward the government. Additionally, the detail within the official government documents provide the context necessary to understand how exemption status was historically granted and how that impacted the Military Service Act of 1917. The letters used for this paper are typically addressed to a clear member of the NRRO and the purpose of the letter is quite clear to its recipient and audience.

The lack of dates on some of the documents makes it difficult because it then requires a closer examination of the document to see if its content is able to place it chronologically in the history of the NRRO. Although the letters are part of NRRO correspondence, not all the

response letters are found within the archive. The lack of response letters within correspondence is challenging because it allows some of the questions asked within the correspondence to have unknown answers, which could be useful. While the official government documents contain detail, these documents only reflect the public position of the government as a whole. Therefore, these documents make it difficult to know whether or not this public position accurately reflected the beliefs and perspectives of judges and government officials involved in the granting of exemption status.

These categorized primary sources will thus primarily make up the source bank to answer the main research question regarding how the NRRO and exemption status can used to shed light on the relationship between the Canadian government and minority religious groups in Canada.

The role of both a faith-based and national identity surrounded the debate of non-resistant bodies during the First World War. Robynne Healey argues that the war was a catalyst for the emphasis in acting on non-resistance and this act of non-resistance created public questioning and judgement on whether or not Mennonites were "true" Canadians.[204] Contrary to how other scholars that focus on responses to the Great War, Healey analyzes the War's role in non-resistance. This idea of a global war meant that all corners of the world would somehow be affected by its repercussions. Conscription during the First World War brought to the forefront the possible intersection of non-violence belief systems and military combatant service. This possible occurrence of military service is thus what sparked Mennonites and Brethren in Christ bodies to join together to represent their pacifist beliefs. However, these pacifist views conflicted with militaristic and nationalist values of Canadians, creating a negative image of non-resistant's.

[204] Robynne Healey, *Canadian Churches and the First World War*, Edited by Gordon L. Heath, Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2014

When the Military Service Act of 1917 came into effect, Mennonites and Brethren in Christ men in Ontario wanted to know what acts and laws were in place regarding exemption status for those with non-resistant views. Within the "Memorandum of Laws Affecting the Members of the Mennonite Religious Society and Military Service in Canada", it states that a certification of exemption could be granted if "he conscientiously objects to the undertaking of combatant service and is prohibited from so doing by the tenets and articles of faith, in effect on the 6th day of July 1917, of any organized religious denomination existing and well organized in Canada at such a date, and to which he in good faith belongs."[205] Although these religious bodies would include Mennonite and Brethren in Christ groups, exemption from combatant service would still separate these religious groups from the rest of Canada. Attaining conscientious objector status bore the possibility of being judged or interpreted as not being loyal to Canada or wanting an excuse to not face the hardships of participating in military service. These laws mentioned in the memorandum were surely applicable to the Manitoba Mennonites during their immigration in the late twentieth century, but Ontario Mennonites wanted to ensure whether they would be eligible for exemption from military service.

As an effort to resolve tension with other Canadians and the government, non-resistant bodies in Ontario wanted to demonstrate that exemption status from combatant service did not mean that these bodies could not assist the war effort in other ways. On November 17, 1917, Mennonite and Brethren in Christ elders were called together to discuss ways in which they could express gratitude toward the Canadian government for exemption privileges given to

[205] "Memorandum of Laws Affecting the Members of the Mennonite Religious Society and Military Service in Canada." Non-Resistant Relief Organization, Mennonite Archives of Ontario.

Canadian Mennonites in the past.[206] This meeting to discuss a tangible way to thank the government for historically granting exemption privileges expressed that Mennonites were not oblivious to the role that combatant service plays within the state. The Military Service Act, therefore, acted as the spark for Mennonites to figure out how to gain assurance regarding their exemption from combatant service. This meeting in November of 1917 thus had the sole purpose of figuring out a way to ensure that the government would be willing to relieve Mennonite men of age from being called-up during the draft. This meeting would then reflect how best to alleviate the tension with the government regarding how to adhere to individual religious beliefs, but also abide by the role and stance of the state on a global scale.

The creation of an organization to practically thank the government for exemption status had to be based on the assurance that there would be exemption granted to the appropriate Mennonite and Brethren in Christ men. When discussing the possibility of exemption in 1917, "whereas it appears from the official documents and correspondence in the hands of those present, that the government of Canada through the Militia department has endeavoured to make ample provision for the various bodies represented, and yet there seems to be room for suspicion at least that their security after all is not absolute."[207] Until the possibility of the status of exemption was known, the first meeting was adjourned. Since the future of the organization could be discussed until the security of exemption was confirmed, it is clear that central to this organization was current exemption rather than gratitude for privileges in the past. Therefore, this organization was not as concerned with a gratitude of past exemption privileges, but sought a way for their religious beliefs to be upheld through a practical form of historical gratitude. The

[206] *Minutes of a Meeting November 19, 1917* and *Minutes of a Meeting January 16, 1918*. Mennonite Archives of Ontario, Non-Resistant Relief Organization Minutes and Reports, 1917-March 1919.
[207] Ibid.

creation of this organization would thus act as a way to persuade the government to grant exemption from military service in return for practical method of gratitude.

On January 16, 1918, there was a vote to officially name and establish the Non-Resistant Relief Organization (NRRO).[208] The establishment of the organization thus allowed the NRRO to move forward with a way of practically thanking the government for historic exemption privileges. During the meeting on January 16, the NRRO suggested "a generous fund be raised among the Churches interested, which shall be donated to the Government, as a memorial of appreciation for the privilege of religious liberty, and our freedom from Military Service, which fund shall be used for relief and charitable purposes."[209] This fund was to be collected from Mennonite churches and then go to the government to distribute the fund to people who were affected by the war, such as widows and war sufferers. The creation of this fundraising for relief would not only be limited to Canada, but also extend to those affected by the war globally. The act of in the case of the NRRO demonstrates an alternate way of contributing to the war effort as a way to justify a decision of granting Mennonites and Tunkers exemption status. Therefore, instead of serving in military combat overseas, the Mennonites used their own financial earnings to make their civic contribution to the war effort.

The NRRO's goal of being granted exemption status and creating a relief fund had both civic and religious roots of intention. S.F. Coffman, who directed correspondence with the government, wrote Prime Minister Robert Borden regarding his approval of the NRRO. Coffman wrote that the construction of the NRRO was "to show their gratitude to the government and their interests in the welfare of their fellow-citizens, as well as to share the

[208] *Minutes of a Meeting January 16, 1918*. Mennonite Archives of Ontario, Non-Resistant Relief Organization Minutes and Reports, 1917-March 1919.
[209] Ibid.

burdens of suffering humanity throughout the world, but organizing in the manner and for the purposes herein stated."[210] From a civic perspective, the creation of a relief fund would attempt to balance secular tensions regarding exemption status. Since conscription had entered society, beliefs of pacifism were not well received. The use of discourse used toward the government attempts to share the civic understanding of protecting not only Canada, but also the world and humanity as a whole. The use of this language then allows the NRRO to identify with the government's motivations for recruiting for the war, shaping the organization as one that would assist fellow Canadians and the war effort through economic means. The NRRO also used their religious beliefs when creating the relief fund. In "The meeting of the Committee to Interview the Government," it states that the hope of fundraising the relief fund would encourage churches to donate based on what God has provided.[211] Further, this document mentions that these donations made by what God provides, could possibly help maintain the exemption status. Therefore, this document uses the faith in God's provision to donate money as a way to secure and perpetuate their relationship with the government through the security of exemption status.

To the outside eye, exemption from military service was seen as not giving anything to the war effort as a whole, when it affected the world. Ken Bechtel writes, "Conscientious objectors in the alternative service camps, however, sensed that government and church leaders were "just trying to keep [them] out of the limelight." Military Problems Committee members noted the desirability of removing conscientious objectors from the community so as to "relieve the tension here… the public sentiment against them."[212] Even though Mennonites participated

[210] Samuel Coffman. To The Right Honourable Sir Robert Borden, January 31, 1918. Letter. Mennonite Archives of Ontario. , Non-Resistant Relief Organization Correspondence, 1918-1924.
[211] Samuel Coffman. *The Meeting of the Committee to Interview the Government*. Mennonite Archives of Ontario, Non-Resistant Relief Organization Minutes and Reports, 1917-March 1919.
[212] Ken Bechtel. "A Premillennialist Pacifism: The Canadian Swiss Mennonite Peace Position." *Journal of Mennonite Studies*25 (2007): 94.

by engaging in alternative service camps, they were still looked down upon others. The tension and hostility held by the Canadian public toward conscientious objectors illustrated the way that the country saw the importance of the war effort, regardless of individual faith and beliefs. The removal of C.O's by the Military Problems Committee displays that lack of the government's ability to resolve the tensions between these two groups. This is because instead of mending and resolving the relationship and tensions between these non-resistants' and the rest of Canada, the government simply relieved it without any solution to the broader issue at hand.

Public disposition and perceptions had an effect in the way that Mennonites lived out their faith in their everyday lives. This is largely because the public did not understand the Justice Department's ruling of exemption status. However, this did not prevent the government from monitoring the status of the NRRO and their principles. Frank Epp writes "[e]ven while the Justice Department was giving a favourable reply to S.F. Coffman, he was under surveillance by the police, who became informed on the content of some of his Sunday morning sermons."[213] Therefore, not only did other Canadian citizens become suspicious of the Mennonites, but also the government still had underlying doubts regarding the Mennonites and their non-resistant principles of faith. The fact that sermons were being policed demonstrates how the government aimed to control and monitor the beliefs and messages of an outlier religious group opposed to military combatant service. During the later months of 1917, the government was in dire need of soldiers to replace those who had died in combat. Policing sermons was a way for the government to know the exact content being taught. This surveillance would shed light on the specific audience that these messages were being directed toward, ensuring that other Canadian citizens were not being exposed to these controversial beliefs of non-violence. Thus, the

[213] Frank H. Epp, and Douglas Ratchford, *Mennonites in Canada, 1786-1920: The History of a Separate People*, Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1974: 377.

government used surveillance as a way to know the exact non-resistant principles being preached to Mennonites. It is also important to note that the German ethnic background of these Mennonites influenced the decision to police these sermons. Nevertheless, surveillance maintained and controlled public opinions of Canadians, ensuring that the government would still have men to call-up for the draft.

The outcome of the relief fund assisted with transforming the way that Canadians understood and perceived the non-resistant bodies. Thomas Reesor writes that there was a large group that disapproved the non-resistant stance.[214] Since the NRRO's donation was the largest of any organized body, Thomas Reesor viewed the relief fund as "the greatest conciliatory factor in redeeming the respect for the non-resistant bodies represented in our movement."[215] Therefore, the large amount of funding resulting from this relief fund shifted the perspective of non-resistant bodies. The link between the money raised and the shift in perspectives demonstrates how Canadians changed their mindset when they were able to tangibly view these non-resistant's as contributing to the war effort in their own way. As a result, there were heightened tensions during the war between non-resistants' and other Canadian bodies because at the time there were no tangible collections of money. Further, tensions with the rest of the country over military service were mostly expressed during the period in which the NRRO was securing exemption status contrasting reactions to the large amount of money collected for national and global war relief.

The perspective of exemption from a non-resistant combines the identity of a Canadian citizen and a religious member, affecting the way that these non-resistants' viewed their faith in

[214] *Thomas Reesor's Account of the NRRO*. Mennonite Archives of Ontario. Non-Resistant Relief Organization, Mennonite Archives of Ontario.
[215] *Thomas Reesor's Account of the NRRO*. Mennonite Archives of Ontario. Non-Resistant Relief Organization, Mennonite Archives of Ontario: 6.

light of the government's Military Service Act. The document *Non-Resistant Bodies in World War I*, states "we have always endeavoured to prove ourselves as worthy and honourable citizens of this land, endeavouring by our honest labours and faithful duties to support the nation and its laws respecting our law-makers and rulers. It is our desire to continue to respect and honour our Government and to bear our part of the nation's burdens, feeling that it is not the cost of our blood and life that withholds us from sharing in the military burden, but rather that there are other worthy services in which we may conscientiously and effectively engage for the welfare of our country and fellow-men while faithfully following the teachings and example of Christ our Lord."[216] Non-resistant bodies in Ontario needed to convince the government that alternative means of service to benefit the country would benefit the country in a way other than putting boots on the ground on the Western front. This statement represents the way that these bodies remained rooted in their pacifist beliefs within the larger context of a national duty of military service. The language of "sharing the burden" with the government illustrates that the Mennonites could abide by their pacifist beliefs while still working toward the welfare of the country during war time. This shared burden with this group would allow the Mennonites to fundraise money based on faith, thus convincing the government that their alternative service will benefit the government and the country as a whole. However, the use of this discourse to be granted exemption status demonstrates that prior to NRRO correspondence in Ontario, beliefs in non-violence would not have been a priority when it came to government conscription.

The lack of priority for non-resistant individuals was evident through the results of the local tribunals. From the perspective of the NRRO, they had met with the government, but still struggled with their own and others exemption status. A letter was addressed to S.F. Coffman by

[216] *Non-Resistant Bodies in World War I*. Non-Resistant Relief Organization, Mennonite Archives of Ontario.

Deputy Registrar W.E. Wismar of the Department of Justice on February 1, 1918, acknowledging the NRRO committee's central appeal in response to exemption status.[217] Although the NRRO committee had already stated their organization's purpose to the government, these men were still faced with difficulties securing their exemption. The lack of immediacy in granting the committee status illustrates how the government used central appeals in the legal system as a way of delaying and limiting the amount of men who would receive this status. The delay of exemption status through local tribunals and central appeal judges only made the act of receiving exemption more difficult. These exemption obstacles were a way for the government to control the numbers of Mennonite men who did not want to register for the draft. This caused difficulty for the NRRO, an organization who bore the responsibility of the maintenance of the assurance of exemption.

Although exemption status was officially granted to Mennonites, obstacles arose because official individual rulings had to be granted through local tribunals. In terms of exemption rules and measures, "Coffman was personally excused, but very soon he was wrestling with the problem of young men facing exemption. Within a month after the least deadline for the first recruitment, there were problems of interpretation and application of the rules."[218] It was these interpretations of the rules that became problematic in securing exemption status. When local tribunals and judges interpreted the rules, Mennonite men became more susceptible to have to appeal their case for exemption because the rules for exemption were being filtered through a judge who faced different pressures on this subject. "The tribunals were under great pressure to produce recruits for the services…the local tribunals were under great pressure, therefore, to give

[217] Ibid. , 378.
[218] Frank H. Epp, and Douglas Ratchford, *Mennonites in Canada, 1786-1920: The History of a Separate People*, Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1974: 378.

the government the benefit of any of their doubts when it came to processing exemptions."[219] Since the judges had the government depending on their verdicts, these tribunals were in a complex position in between the non-resistant bodies and the opposing viewpoint of the government. However, the pressure from the government represents the ways that the government sought to control the number of men who would be relieved from combatant service. Through putting pressure on these local tribunals, the government was able to maintain control over how many men were granted exemption and how many men could be used for recruitment to military combatant service. In order to maintain a balance between these two opposing parties, judges then had to develop factors that would assist judges in determining who would be eligible for this status.

Due to external tensions and perspectives of exemption status, attaining exemption status included abiding by certain measures and beliefs. When it came to local tribunals granting individual exemption, "the religious option presented several problems. The first concerned the definition of who was a Mennonite. Under the exemption clause Mennonites were not specifically named, but since a religious claim had to related to a denomination whose tenets of faith on July6, 1917, included opposition to war, the processing of Mennonite claimants as Mennonites was unavoidable."[220] In Mennonite and Brethren in Christ backgrounds, the act of adult baptism marks membership into the church and officially makes one a Mennonite or Brethren in Christ member. Adherents, on the other hand, support ideas or beliefs of the denomination, but are not full members meaning that they have not been baptized. When local tribunals needed to ensure whether one was a Mennonite, the difference between a member and

[219] Ibid. , 378.

[220] Frank H. Epp, and Douglas Ratchford, *Mennonites in Canada, 1786-1920: The History of a Separate People*, Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1974: 379.

adherent held the deciding factor as to whether or not a man would have to serve against his religious beliefs. Since the local tribunals worked on behalf of the government, they were more inclined to assist the government in meeting its military needs. Judges then had to come up with a detailed outliner regarding who was considered a Mennonite and further, whether they held a belief in non-violence to help them in assessing individual appeal cases.

Adult baptism was the ritual used to mark membership into the Mennonite church. Frank Epp writes "in one sense, only those who had been baptized upon confession of faith and entered into the church register as bona-fide members were Mennonites. No attempt would have been made to enlarge on that definition – except for the fact that the baptismal age in most of the Mennonite groups was the marrying age, around 21."[221] Therefore, adherent men in the Mennonite church under 21 faced the risk of being called-up to service simply because of their age and the doctrine of the Mennonite church. Although judges did need to deny men to fill the country's recruitment needs, adherent men were in a complex position. These men held the individual pacifist beliefs, but were not members of the Mennonite church. As a result, Mennonite men under 21 faced severe uncertainty regarding their future in military service.

Responding to S.F. Coffman's letter asking about how many men had received exemption, J. Bolwell communicated about a young man turning 19 who is an adherent in the church and writes that he hoped "the government would decide in favour of our young man."[222] Even though this man was not officially a Mennonite or Brethren in Christ member, this debate over adherent exemption illustrates the tension between individual stances/beliefs and receiving exemption from the government. This letter provides insight regarding which Mennonites and

[221] Frank H. Epp, and Douglas Ratchford, *Mennonites in Canada, 1786-1920: The History of a Separate People*, Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1974: 380.
[222] J. Bolwell. *J. Bolwell to Samuel Coffman, June 1, 1918*. Letter. From Mennonite Archives of Ontario, Members and Adherents Eligible for Service. Non-Resistant Relief Organization. Mennonite Archives of Ontario.

Brethren in Christ men were eligible for this exemption status. Although this young man had all the same beliefs as a Mennonite or Brethren in Christ member, his lack of a membership title made him eligible to be called up to military service instead of exemption. The lack of adherents being able to attain exemption status illustrates the stance that the government took on giving out exemption status. Rather than grant exemption status based on the individual belief of the conscientious objector, the government had the ability to strictly hand out exemption to those who were officially members of non-resistant churches. This would only further posed difficulty for those adherents who then had to act contrary to the belief systems they practiced.

The belief systems of these Anabaptist denominations also shaped the way that alternative service was perceived and viewed by these non-resistant church bodies.

Mennonite and Brethren in Christ faith shaped the way that these religious men viewed the issue of conscription and exemption during the war. In response to Coffman's request for the names of men who were eligible for military service, Jacob R. Bender listed the names per age category as well as laid out his inquiries. The author is writing on the behalf of the young men in his church in Tavistock, ON as well as himself who had questions regarding registration and whether it was a sign relating to Revelation 13.[223] Revelation 13 speaks of the Beast of the Sea and Beast of the Earth and verse 10 mentions that Christians will face persecution, but must remain faithful. This question posed to Bishop Coffman is significant because it demonstrates the extent to which faith and religious beliefs apart from non-resistance shaped the behaviour and actions of Mennonite and Tunker men. Additionally, their faith stance comes up again as there is an emphasis on the government thoroughly understanding the stance they take on war and violence. These men are faithful but also fearful that society does not understand their belief

[223] Jacob R. Bender, *To Samuel Coffman from Jacob Bender*, Letter, Mennonite Archives of Ontario, Members or Adherents Eligible for Service. Non-Resistant Relief Organization. Mennonite Archives of Ontario.

system. This shows the individual tension and struggle that men had to face if their exemption status did not come through and they were forced to perform actions against their religious beliefs but which supported their native country.

The formation of the Non-Resistant Relief Organization was crucial in strengthening the relationship and link between Mennonites and foreign aid, while raising tensions with the government. When studying the NRRO as part of the history of the Mennonite Central Committee, Lucille Marr writes "[w]ith World War I, foreign aid had become linked concretely with the Mennonite doctrine of non-resistance. Aware of the privilege implicit in their conscientious objection status, Canadian Mennonites joined those from the United States who participated in relief work initiated by the Quakers in Western Europe and the Near East."[224] With the status of exemption not known originally for Mennonites in Ontario, Mennonites and Brethren in Christ bodies need a way to ensure that they would again receive the privilege of exemption. Creating a relief fund and participating in foreign aid was a tool used to persuade the government to grant exemption status in light of a need for recruitment in the war. Simultaneously, by using foreign aid as a form of alternative service to Canada, the Mennonites would become linked with assisting with global foreign relief.

Although the NRRO and the idea for a relief fund were formed in early 1918, the fund did not start collecting money until later in the year. In later 1918, the NRRO sent an official letter out to Mennonite and Tunker churches in Ontario. Within the letter the NRRO makes reference to its tardiness by stating that "the objects of the organization have been considerably delayed on account of uncertainties which obtained relative to the legal status of the churches represented in this movement, under the Military Service Act of 1917, and the Order in Council

[224] Lucille Marr, "The History of Mennonite Central Committee: Developing a Genre," *Journal of Mennonite Studies*23 (January 2005): 49.

of April 20th, 1918."[225] The NRRO were delayed in sending this fundraising letter because they wanted to ensure exemption status before starting to collect money for this memorial fund. This waiting period before collecting money illustrates that the goal of the relief fund would only progress and move forward if Mennonites and Tunkers were secured exemption status. This once again suggests that this fund was used as a sort of leverage to ensure that this religious group did not have to pursue militant combatant service. Based on the document, there were at least 4 months in between the creation of the NRRO and this letter being distributed. This gap represents the measures and correspondence between different government levels and within the non-resistant that had to be conducted, illustrating the pressure that was put on both the NRRO and the government during these months. Also, religious bodies would not give large financial donations if they were not ensured this status to which the NRRO created this fund as a gratitude for.

This fundraising letter that was sent out to non-resistant bodies contained religious civic discourse encouraging the collection of funds for the NRRO's relief fund. Historically in Europe and in Canada, Mennonites and other non-resistant bodies had to pay taxes to the government in order to receive exemption status in times of violent and military combat service.[226] Within this letter to the Mennonite and Tunker people, the NRRO asked that each man who gained from military exemption pay one hundred dollars to the relief fund.[227] As mentioned, the NRRO and its relief fund were created as an attempt to secure exemption status from the Canadian government. This is further supported by this request for military aged men to contribute a

[225] *Thomas Reesor's Account of the NRRO*. Mennonite Archives of Ontario. Non-Resistant Relief Organization, Mennonite Archives of Ontario.
[226] *Thomas Reesor's Account of the NRRO*. Mennonite Archives of Ontario. Non-Resistant Relief Organization, Mennonite Archives of Ontario.
[227] *Thomas Reesor's Account of the NRRO*. Mennonite Archives of Ontario. Non-Resistant Relief Organization, Mennonite Archives of Ontario.

hundred dollars each to this fund. This fund operated through men donating to the relief fund, and then that fund would be given to the government to distribute amongst charitable and war relief organizations. As this fund was used to secure exemption, these Mennonite and Tunker men appear to be paying the government for this C.O. status. This idea of donating to a relief fund to secure exemption illustrates the ways that the NRRO used this fund as a way to engineer alternative service means in light of a need for recruitment. Engineering an alternative way to secure exemption through a memorial fund demonstrates the ways in which civic duty and military combatant service contrasted with religious pacifist beliefs in minority religious groups. Therefore, the delay in sending the letter was not only a result of difficulties securing exemption, but to ensure that that fund would receive ample funding. The ample funding on behalf of the NRRO would have the ability to ease government relations as well as ease tension with the rest of the Canadian population.

Following the end of the war on November 11, 1918, the NRRO had distributed an expenditures report, which detailed where the relief fund money had been distributed. A total amount of $60,005 was divided between the Soldier's Aid Commission of Ontario for the Relief of Soldier's Children, Belgian Relief Fund, Secours National French Relief Fund, and The Navy League for Merchant's Soldiers Widows and Orphans.[228] This relief funding toward those affected by war times helped cement the Mennonite and Tunkers as being willing to participate and fundraise for foreign aid. Following the end of the war, there an increased need for economic and social assistance based on the war's effects. When the fund was ready to be distributed, the government provided the NRRO with a list of funds and organizations that the money could be distributed that would still abide by these bodies values and beliefs. The

[228] *Thomas Reesor's Account of the NRRO*. Mennonite Archives of Ontario. Non-Resistant Relief Organization, Mennonite Archives of Ontario: 6.

NRRO's funds were distributed to areas directed toward social and economic needs. However, this distribution of NRRO funds implied that the government could then put their money to use in different ways. With this saved money, the government had the power and ability to use that money in whatever way they saw necessary, whether rebuilding Canada's military or assisting with the development of welfare for citizens after the war.

Following the war, the NRRO did not disband, but rather continued to participate in assisting with foreign aid. Some of the foreign relief they assisted with includes famine relief in Spain and in China.[229] This famine relief further deepened the Mennonites ties with global relief. Additionally, some members of the NRRO and its bodies assisted with addressing the immigration policy in Canada to help Russian Mennonites seek refuge in Canada from persecution in Russia during the Civil war and Communism.[230] In 1919, there was an immigration ban for Mennonites due to the increasing migration during the war because of the granting of exemption status. Recognizing the Russian Mennonites were in danger, the NRRO and other Mennonite bodies took a stance against the government to change this immigration policy. This situation regarding migration demonstrated the ability for Mennonites and the NRRO to once again attempt to manipulate in a way and persuade the government to change its stance on a topic that had global effects. This persuasion revolved centrally around convincing the government that these Russian Mennonites were in dire need due to the civil war and persecution. Therefore, this immigration debate demonstrates how the government's relationship to the NRRO and non-resistant bodies was not simply contained to wartime, but was constantly in play in different scenarios relating to Canada.

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[229] Esther Ruth Epp. "The Origins of Mennonite Central Committee (Canada)." M.A. thesis, University of Manitoba, 1980: 17.

[230] Esther Ruth Epp. "The Origins of Mennonite Central Committee (Canada)." M.A. thesis, University of Manitoba, 1980: 26.

During the Second World War, the NRRO was reactivated to act as an agency for Mennonite and Brethren in Christ bodies and to once again raise a relief fund. In 1939, the NRRO worked together with the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) to help with relief in Europe. Post the Second World War, in 1946, the NRRO became part of the new Conference of Historic Peace Churches (CHPC). This meant that the NRRO would no longer make representations in government. The NRRO thus worked with the CHPC on international relief projects. In 1964, the CHPC and NRRO amalgamated with the MCC to form a new Mennonite Central Committee that still participates in relief work today. The MCC will celebrate its 100th anniversary in 2020. The NRRO is one of the MCC's important origins that need to be recognized because of the complex dynamic of remaining true to one's faith while also remaining true to one's country.

Furthermore, the history and origins of the Non-Resistant Relief Organization emphasized socio-political tensions between the government and the non-resistant bodies of Ontario between during the Great War and its affects between 1917-1919. The origins of the NRRO can be viewed as a case study of examining the relationship between the Canadian government and minority religious groups in Canada during wartimes.

The formation of the NRRO was an organizational body used by non-resistant's as a way to secure exemption status by creating a memorial fund that would be given to the government for national and global war relief. Although Mennonites and Tunkers were simply following their faith and beliefs, their stance was not well perceived by the government and other Canadians who recognized the need for more boots on the ground in Europe. As a result of pressure from the government, men who wanted exemption rather than registering for the draft, local tribunals often denied exemption resulting in an increase in appeals despite the government

officially granting that status. As a result, local tribunals had to come up with specific rules and expectations such as who was considered a Mennonite in order to balance the pressures and tensions between the government and non-resistant bodies. However, despite the difficulties in receiving exemption, the NRRO's relief fund brought in a tremendous amount of money, distributed to war relief funds, then allowing the government to allocate their money to different places.

The government's ability to enforce conscription unveils the difficult balance between a nation's beliefs and its citizen's individual religious beliefs. This is specifically seen though the examination of how individual religious beliefs and actions must be approved by the state within the context of national military service. The study of the NRRO provides insight into how religious beliefs about non-violence can be restricted and constrained in the face of a state's involvement in a global war.

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ontario/files/uploads/files/nrro_minutes_1917_1919mar_2.pdf

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Tasha Stephenson

In today's world, the threat of terrorism remains an ever-present shadow. Whether it is the increased security checks at airports, the United States Immigration Ban, or Islamophobia, the legacy of the 9/11 attacks lives on. Upon first considering terrorist organizations in the Middle East, ones first thoughts would be of ISIS, Osama bin Laden, or Saddam Hussein. Not even the fourth or fifth thought, would have readers thinking about a sect of guerrilla insurgents known as the mujahideen. Despite their disappearance within the minds of North America, the mujahideen hold a torrid history and relationship with the American Media. To better understand the integration of terrorism into the American identity, this essay will pursue two areas of questioning. First, this essay will investigate the portrayal of the mujahideen in the *New York Times* during the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, then investigate how the mujahideen were portrayed in a post 9/11 society. The goal of this paper is to better understand the representation

of the mujahideen as a rallying point for the American public during times of trouble. The depiction of the mujahideen may differ in diction over time dependent on American society's understanding of terrorism as a fixed definition, instead of terrorism as a continuum. By exploring the advocation for the mujahideen within the context of the Soviet intervention Afghanistan and followed by the progression of the mujahideen from a positive figure into a negative one after 9/11. Overall, this essay will explore how the portrayal of the mujahideen by the *New York Times* created a positive enforcement of American values and "righteousness" into the population's mythos.

Literature Review and Methodology

One of the most frustrating issues in the study of media portrayals of mujahideen, is the lack of secondary sources. While in the *New York Times*, the primary use of the term "mujahideen" was associated with the People's Mujahideen- a political and militant organization who used terrorism, there are only references to generalized usages of the term. The specifics on mujahideen action are hidden behind different groupings based off of "social and tribal organizations"[231] but never provide a distinction for the separate groups. It is this lack of record that made a contextual study of the mujahideen one that required reading the silence around the term. Historical sources hardly ever specify the different groups at play and almost never directly reference the People's Mujahideen.

Sources such as Jiyai Zhou's "The Muslim Battalions: Soviet Central Asians in the Soviet-Afghan War" outlined the participation of the combatants on both sides, but never expanded upon the role of the mujahideen beyond their definition and motives.[232] As frustrating

[231]Geoff Shaw & David Spencer (2003) Fighting in Afghanistan: Lessons from the Soviet intervention, 1979–89, Defense & Security Analysis, 19:2, 177-188, 178
[232] Jiayi Zhou "The Muslim Battalions: Soviet Central Asians in the Soviet-Afghan War" *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 2012, 303

as that is, it follows a common theme in the historiography of generalizing the word. The military account of "Fighting in Afghanistan: Lessons from the Soviet Intervention, 1979-1989" remained accurate to the title. The authors Geoff Shaw and David Spencer received Doctorates in Diplomatic and Military history,[233] and Political science with focus on insurgency and terrorism respectively.[234] Despite their background, neither of the authors refer to the mujahideen as terrorists. They do however, expand the definition of mujahideen into "tribal and societal organizations of guerrilla fighters"[235] and outlined their zero sum ideology outcome when their deaths were sacrifice to the fight against the Soviet union.[236] Neither author named specific groups, but it assisted to clarify the general term. The final source continued to disappoint. Although entitled "The Future of the Mujahideen: Legitimacy, Legacy and Demobilization in Post-Bonn Afghanistan" by Michael Bhatia, this article did not provide context for a specific historical narrative of the mujahideen. To be fair, Bhatia surpassed the last two by explaining "aggregation under a single title neglects the difference in structuring, geographical scope of operation, type of activities, community relations, and methods of mobilizing and retaining combatants."[237] Although this article ignored relations between the United States during the Soviet Intervention, or after the 9/11 attacks, Bhatia did provide an interesting commentary into the power of myth.[238] The term holds a lasting religious connotation for the fighters and as such holds power when it comes to issues of the civil-religiousness of the United States and the

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[233] Geoff Shaw (n.d) LinkedIn [Education]. Retrieved March 27 from ca.linkedin.com/in/geoff-shaw-8513051a
David Spencer, "Dr. David Spencer." William J. Perry Center. Accessed March 28, 2018. https://www.williamjperrycenter.org/about/faculty/dr-david-spencer.
[235] Geoff Shaw & David Spencer (2003) Fighting in Afghanistan: Lessons from the Soviet intervention, 1979–89, Defense & Security Analysis, 19:2, 177-188, 178
[236] Ibid, 179
[237] Michael Bhatia "The Future of the Mujahideen: Legitimacy, Legacy and Demobilization in Post-Bonn Afghanistan" *International Peacekeeping*, 14(1) 2007. 95
[238] Ibid, 94

eventual othering of Muslims in a post 9/11 world. While the majority of the sources were disappointing, they all provide minor context to assist in understanding the structure and organization of the mujahideen in general. It is important to note once more, that none of these sources labelled the mujahideen as terrorists.

The second narrative of secondary sources, was the need to understand American foreign policy. Where the previous historians skirted around direct discussion between American intervention and the mujahideen, the historians of American foreign policy responded with much more candour. The first article outlined American Foreign Policy with Iran and while it only covered the span between 1979-1980, it set the foundation for further interactions with the United States. Christian Emery's article "United States Iran Policy 1979-1980: The Anatomy and Legacy of American Diplomacy" led with a blatant statement of support by the Carter administration for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to avoid a political vacuum and further triggering a Cold War Crisis.[239] Although never directly mentioning the mujahideen, this article was used to explain American values and political messages that were found in *New York Times* articles. The article used for understanding American foreign policy in the post 9/11 period was "American Nationalism and U.S. Foreign Policy from September 11 to the Iraq War." Paul T. McCartney's article outlined the factors and strategies that Bush used to manipulate foreign policy through the American people. Their identity as missionaries, the crusading mentality[240] and American civil religion combined with American nationalism led to the application of American exceptionalism to foreign policy.[241] All the while, McCartney underlined the importance of mythos and epic to American culture and how Bush manipulated religion,

[239] Christian Emery "United States Iran Policy 1979-1980: The Anatomy and Legacy of American Diplomacy" *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 2013, 621
[240] Paul T. McCarteney, "American Nationalism and U.S. Foreign Policy from September 11 to the Iraq War" *Political Science Quarterly*. 119 (3). 2004. 400
[241] Ibid, 403

patriotism, and mythos to justify the "war on terror" and involvement in Iraq. Once again, these articles were used to understand the social, cultural, and political ideas during the time of the primary sources.

The final area of study drew upon analytical papers that pertained to media studies within the context of terrorism. The majority of research fell within this category to better understand the strategies used to affect perspective in newspapers. Of the four articles referenced, one addressed the Soviet Intervention, two on the portrayal of muslims after 9/11 and then a working record of the othering of Muslims in both time periods. "The Evil Empire" by Jothik Kirshnaiah, Nancy Signorielli, and Douglas M McLeod presented a journalistic analysis of the propaganda framework for American coverage of the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan to determine that "media coverage was heavily influenced by anti-communist ideology braced by the potential communist threat."[242] The next piece "The effect of terrorist events on media portrayals of Islam and Muslims: evidence from *New York Times* headlines, 1985-2013" used a far more statistical point of analysis to track different ways in which muslims were portrayed in media. Overall, this article found that headlines were increasingly positive after terrorist attacks.[243] Even so, the largest contribution of this article was the attention to gendered coverage,[244] and the victimized or problematized lenses in headlines.[245] This helped draw notice to interpretations of sources that might have been missed otherwise. Derek Silva's "The Othering of Muslims: Discourses of Radicalization in the *New York Times*, 1964-2014" covered a vaster period of time but focused

[242] Jothik Krishnaiah, Nancy Signorielli, & Douglas M. McLeod "The Evil Empire Revisited: New York Times Coverage of the Soviet Intervention in and Withdrawal From Afghanistan" *Journalism Quarterly* 1993, 647
[243] Erik Bleich, Hasher Nisar, and Rana Abdelhamid, "The effect of terrorist events on media portrayal of Islam and Muslims: evidence from New York Times headlines, 1985-2013" *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2016, 1111
[244] Ibid 1110
[245] Ibid 1114

more on the intertwining relationship between the portrayals of radicalized Islam. His work provided an expansive and comprehensive guide to understanding the transformative cultural representations that the *New York Times* published through the use of political, cultural, and religious markers.[246] The investigation into media studies ended with "History as the Metaphor through Which the Current World is Viewed: British and American newspapers: Uses of History Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks." This collaborative work established the reliance on history to explain events[247] and the formation of a national identity.[248] Just as the papers previously, this article helped to understand the subtleties of American journalism to represent cultural values and concern without stating them outright. When combined, these articles cover an expanse of analysis that can be applied to historical evidence to better understand the primary sources that do address the mujahideen.

Just as there is a sparsity of information on the mujahideen in secondary sources, so to is there a shortage of mentions of the mujahideen in the *New York Times*. The majority of coverage referenced the group "The People's Mujahideen." The selection of primary sources were accrued by searching the term "mujahideen" and its variances in the *New York Times* archives. The reason for selecting only the *New York Times* is due to its reputation as a "voice of record"[249] and global readership. This was a unifying factor between both periods of study despite their obvious difference.

The first distinction between study periods was temporal while the other was spatial. Selections were drawn from the 1979-1989 time period and from directly after the 9/11 attacks

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[246] Derek M.D. Silva "The Othering of Muslims: Discourses of Radicalization in the New York Times, 1969-2014" *Sociological Forum* 2017, 139

[247]Betty Houchin Winfield, Barbara Friedman, & Vivara Trisnadi "History as the Metaphor through Which the Current World is Viewed: British and American newspapers' uses of history following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks" *Journalism Studies* 2002, 289

[248] Ibid, 290

[249] Ibid, 291

up to the end of 2003. The majority of the article coverage took place within Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The three countries hold different histories and culture, but all hold active mujahideen cells within their borders. By understanding mujahideen activity geographically, we can understand the mujahideen not as a national organization, but as a sub-national entity.

Context

As suggested above, there are three main strains of contextualization for this body of research. To understand the incorporation of terrorism into American narrative through print publications one needs an understanding of the state of the media, America's foreign policy, and activity of the mujahideen in the Middle East. To begin, it is important to understand just who the mujahideen are. The term itself holds religious origins in Islam as "Warriors of God."[250] That being said, there is not just one sole mujahideen group tied to a single country, but mobile warriors who pursue jihad. Within this paper, the most commonly discussed group is Harakat Ul-Mujahidin, or more commonly called "The People's Mujahideen." By 1979, Iran had just finished a revolution in which they overthrew their Shah and ended in a government under Ayatollah Khomeini as a religious leader and the head of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Khomeini originally preached Western values before later revealing his anti-American ideology.[251] This conflict occurred within the quarrel between Americans and Soviets and developed Iran into a stage for a communist versus capitalist battleground.[252] The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan allied with the USSR inflicted communist doctrine despite protests from the population who

[250] Jiayi Zhou "The Muslim Battalions: Soviet Central Asians in the Soviet-Afghan War" *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 2012, 303
[251] Christian Emery "United States Iran Policy 1979-1980: The Anatomy and Legacy of American Diplomacy" *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 2013, 624
[252] Ibid, 622

feared that communism went against Afghan values.[253] The People's Mujahideen were labelled as terrorists, but more attention was paid to their empathy of American values. Travel 22 years later, and the relationship becomes more complicated. 9/11 was a key event in forming America's modern identity. It spurred counterterrorism action, the Iraq War, and even fear of domestic terrorism. At this point, American foreign policy and the action of mujahideen became immensely intertwined. American foreign policy entered a time of American nationalization and exceptionalism. This idea encapsulates the perceived transcendency of American action and morals for having a providential destiny. Bush relied heavily on these tactics to secure support from the public for his actions.[254] It was under the Bush administration that we see behaviour most associated with counter-terrorism action of today. Just like in the 1980's the Middle East was in a state of unrest and the mujahideen remained prominent in *New York Times* coverage as active agents for American interests. During these periods, the media used specific strategies to sway public opinion to positive, or negative interpretations. The earliest analysis of *New York Times* headlines comes from "The Evil Empire Revisited: New York Times Coverage of the Soviet Intervention In and Withdrawal From Afghanistan." This article published in 1993 explored Herman and Chomsky's propaganda framework that entailed the influence of anti-communist ideology and the Soviet threat in print publication.[255] Other strategies of analysis included the media using history to better provide context to current events,[256] the positive lenses

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[253] Jiayi Zhou "The Muslim Battalions: Soviet Central Asians in the Soviet-Afghan War" *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 2012, 303

[254] Paul T. McCarteney, "American Nationalism and U.S. Foreign Policy from September 11 to the Iraq War" *Political Science Quarterly*. 119 (3). 2004. 404

[255] Jothik Krishnaiah, Nancy Signorielli, & Douglas M. McLeod "The Evil Empire Revisited: New York Times Coverage of the Soviet Intervention in and Withdrawal From Afghanistan" *Journalism Quarterly* 1993, 647

[256] Betty Houchin Winfield, Barbara Friedman, & Vivara Trisnadi "History as the Metaphor through Which the Current World is Viewed: British and American newspapers' uses of history following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks" *Journalism Studies* 2002, 291

of the portrayals of muslims,[257] and conversely how the portrayal of muslims became gradually more radicalized throughout the period of study.[258] In comparing and understanding these three contexts, the history of the portrayal of mujahideen, becomes clearer.

1979-1989

The first major consideration of American values in mujahideen coverage appeared alongside the Cold War. Starting as early as 1979, there are favourable mentions of mujahideen as the natural opposition for communist incursion. The article "Arafat in Iran Republic Reports Khomenini Pledges Aid for Israel" authored by James M. Markham on February 19, 1979 reported the alliance between the Palestine Liberation Oragnization's (PLO) Yasir Arafat and Ayatollah Khomeini. Markham draws specific notice to Arafat's exclusion of the People's Fedayeen who were associated with Marxism.[259] This separation from the non communist mujahideen and communist Fedeyeen is an obvious signifier of conflict between USSR and American values. In accordance with a study by Jothnik Krishnaiah, Nancy Signorielli, and Douglas McLeod, there are two important observations applied to Markham's article. The researchers observed that victims of non-communist violence received far less coverage than those impacted by communist related violence,[260] and non-threatening elements- such as the revolutionary mujahideen-

[257]Erik Bleich, Hasher Nisar, and Rana Abdelhamid, "The effect of terrorist events on media portrayal of Islam and Muslims: evidence from New York Times headlines, 1985-2013" *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 2016, 1114

[258] Derek M.D. Silva "The Othering of Muslims: Discourses of Radicalization in the New York Times, 1969-2014" *Sociological Forum* 2017, 139

[259] James M. Markham "Arafat, in Iran, Reports Khomeini Pledges Aid for Victory Over Israeli" *New York Times* (New York City), Feb 19, 1979

[260] Jothik Krishnaiah, Nancy Signorielli, & Douglas M. McLeod "The Evil Empire Revisited: New York Times Coverage of the Soviet Intervention in and Withdrawal From Afghanistan" *Journalism Quarterly* 1993. 648

received positive coverage even within the face of violence.[261] These points are represented within this article by the avoidance of mentioning the trauma that the PLO enacted on the Israeli population. Instead of outlining the horrific deeds of the PLO, the article is one of a non-communist organization ignoring a communist one. Furthermore, you have the establishment of the mujahideen as "freedom fighters" and received a positive reputation instead of attention to their alliance with another violent organization. It is not a far stretch between the words "freedom" and "anti-communist" that American values appear. Another positive representation of the mujahideen arose in an article published nine days later by Nicholas Gage titled "Iranian City Torn by Scramble for Power." This article told the story of the Iranian city of Tabriz. Gage wrote that the city "is being guided these days with much enthusiasm and inexperience by 4 religious leaders, 19 revolutionary committees and scores of armed militia bands." He later went on to memorialize the Mujahideen activity in the words "take to the streets every night to root out suspected agents of the Shah, confront the Marxist guerrillas of the People's Fedayeen or shoot it out with the other militias that are jockeying for power."[262] Once more you have the illustration of communism versus the Mujahideen, but now with an homage to American paranoia. The "propaganda framework" as dictated by Chomsky and Herman expressed that "media coverage has been heavily influenced by an anti-communist ideology braced by the potential Soviet threat to American society."[263] The diction that Gage used to describe the "rooting out of agents" so closely to a communist organization is reminiscent to the fear of Soviet agents within America. Gage's words clearly place the Mujahideen within the realm of

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[261] Ibid, 649
[262] Nicholas Gage, "Iranian City Torn by a Scramble for Power" *New York Times* (New York City) Feb 28, 1979
[263] Jothik Krishnaiah, Nancy Signorielli, & Douglas M. McLeod "The Evil Empire Revisited: New York Times Coverage of the Soviet Intervention in and Withdrawal From Afghanistan" *Journalism Quarterly* 1993. 647

defenders against those who threatened American society. By stopping the threats at the source without American military intervention, the Mujahideen were pre-emptive combatants against communist factions. This aspect of the Cold War paranoia aligned them as protectors for American values and established them as allies. The final article for Cold War consideration travels to 1985 Afghanistan. Orrin Hatch a Utah Republican Senator published an opinion piece on November 22, 1985 titled "Don't Forget the Afghans." Hatch reported the crimes of the Soviet Union with words such as "terrorizing, torturing, and genocide" against the Afghans to try to squash the mujahideen resistance in the area.[264] This vivid detail encompasses the victim framework as posed by Bleich, Nisar and Abdelhamid in their analysis of the portrayal of muslims in the New York Times.[265] This situation is designed to strike empathy for the Afghan innocents and the resilient mujahideen. It is the evil communists and the "Afghan puppet regime" that were enacting these atrocities. Atrocities that would be enacted on America if it was not for their loyal protectors-the mujahideen. In this portrayal, they are not only heroes to the Afghans but also to Americans. Once more, these warriors based within Islam had protected American interests by rebelling against the Soviet government. By so thoroughly integrating the combat of the mujahideen into pro American Cold War narrative, the *New York Times* succeeded in creating empathy and ties to American concerns. This represented the shift from a foreign issue of politicians and into a concern suited for the American public.

A step away from the Cold War paradigm, is the issue of gendered reform in Iranian policy. The first conflict presented by the *New York Times* journalist Youssef Ibrahim published on February 28, 1979 explored the reaction to the harshness of Islamic law especially against

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[264] Orrin G. Hatch "Don't Forget the Afghans" *New York Times* (New York City) November 22, 1985
[265] Erik Bleich, Hasher Nisar, and Rana Abdelhamid, "The effect of terrorist events on media portrayal of Islam and Muslims: evidence from New York Times headlines, 1985-2013" *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2016, 1114

women's rights. Ibrahim later wrote the alliance of the People's Mujahideen with the women who protested Khomeini's regulation and governance.[266] This story's headline is both victimized and gendered to affect the negative perception of those in power and a positive one for those who opposed them. The Iranian government did not represent social progress, but a relapse into outdated human rights against women. In a follow up article on March 12, 1979, Ibrahim continued to cover the issue and created a connection with American readership by describing the women to be dressed in the "western style" at a protest at Tehran University. Not only did this create easily imaginable visuals between Iranian and American women, it also drew attention to the longstanding association of Western social reform occurring within a scholarly community. By specifying this demonstration at an academic location, Ibrahim was able to combat the concept of Iran being an "irrational" country that the Carter government attempted to depict.[267] The mujahideen and the women who partook in the rally were logical and trained to believe in the same social reforms and values that Americans did. This article proceeded with a statement by Khomeini saying that those who were "writing continually talk of democracy are either stupid people who do not understand what they say or are traitors."[268] This insult to the American value of democracy within the context of social reform is excellent example for religious conflict as a marker for political conflict.[269] The attempt at enforcing women to wear veils with justification from the Quran represents a religious conflict turned social and then political. Khomeini was insulting the social reforms of the past, but also deemed those who

[266] Youssef M. Ibrahim "Some in Iran Finding Islamic Law Harsh, its Justice Swift" *New York Times* (New York City) March 1, 1979
[267] Christian Emery "United States Iran Policy 1979-1980: The Anatomy and Legacy of American Diplomacy" *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 2013, 631
[268] Youssef M. Ibrahim "Foes of Khomeini Focusing on Issue of Women's Rights" *New York Times* (New York City) March 12, 1979
[269] Derek M.D. Silva "The Othering of Muslims: Discourses of Radicalization in the New York Times, 1969-2014" *Sociological Forum* 2017, 139

supported women to be traitors instead of the heroes of a westernized narrative view. In accordance with American social reform, the Mujahideen were painted as allies of women's right and guardians against those who would infringe upon them. Through this case study of gender in Iran, the mujahideen were continually portrayed as the voice of reason for the American people abroad.

Closely tied to the idea of gendered reform was the application of American values to mujahideen action. Returning to the article by Orrin Hatch "Don't Forget the Afghans," the Republican Senator littered the piece with American values. Phrases such as "determination, courage" and stressing the "support of their countrymen"painted a pretty picture of the struggling warrior fighting in the name of their people. He went on to say that despite the Soviet Union's best efforts, the mujahideen "would not be squashed."[270] This portrayal of the mujahideen once again hinged upon the idea of the fighters as protectors of the American people from the Soviet threat. The influence of the *New York Times* to create linkages between mujahideen and American foreign policy occurred in Elaine Sicioline's coverage of "Three Iranians at UN tell of Torture by Revolutionary Guard" in 1985. As the title suggests, the article told the tale of the prosecution of the local population because of their support for the mujahideen against the Soviets and Khomeini's anti-American regime.[271] Returning to the victimized framework of headlines, American readership is invited to empathize with the innocents, and the mujahideen that they support. Along this idea of victim and aggressor, Sicioline demonized Khomeini so that the trauma could be translated into an epic of the mujahideen heroes and the evil Khomeini. This shift of focus away from the Soviet threat onto another can be explained by the theory that media coverage requires an external threat to maintain a homogenous structure of Western public

[270] Orrin G. Hatch "Don't Forget the Afghans" *New York Times* (New York City) November 22, 1985
[271] Elaine Siciolino "3 Iranians, At U.N. Tell of Torture By Revolutionary Guards" *New York Times* (New York City) December 5, 1985

opinion.[272] The media succeeded in condemning the agent of anti-American threat and celebrated those who would protect the innocent from attacks. It is this linkage through victimization and nostalgia, that the *New York Times* was able to spread messages of support for the mujahideen instead of condemnation for an organization based in Islamic religious tradition.

It is at this point in time that it is is important to analyze two articles that actively address the People's Mujahideen as terrorists. The two articles published in 1985, and 1986 both use the word "terrorist" but does not hold the same weight of the word in the post 9/11 period. The article "Around the World, Legislators Unaware US Blacklisted Iran Rebels" on August 9, 1985 discussed support from "2000 politicians and legislators in the United States and Western Europe" despite the State Department labelling them as a terrorist organization.[273] There terrorist actions read more as a fluff piece than one hoping to discuss real world consequences of the politicians endorsement of the People's Mujahideen. The article wrapped up with a statement declaring that they were not "anti-American" and were true freedom fighters. All in all, despite being labeled as terrorists, the *New York Times* revealed that there was not nearly the moralistic weight behind the word "terrorist" that we would find today. The methods of this group could be rationalized by the Mujahideen representing an American puppet warrior that did not hold the risk of American intervention. The next time that the Mujahideen are mentioned as a terrorist organization is a court case against the Iran Relief Fund Inc. They list the reason for prosecution as a misuse of fund being siphoned to the People's Mujahideen instead of general relief. The article painted the picture that it was not because the People's Mujahideen were "pro-terrorist"

[272] Jothik Krishnaiah, Nancy Signorielli, & Douglas M. McLeod "The Evil Empire Revisited: New York Times Coverage of the Soviet Intervention in and Withdrawal From Afghanistan" *Journalism Quarterly* 1993. 649

[273] AP "Around the World; Legislators Unaware US Blacklisted Iran Rebels" (New York City) August 9, 1985

but because of a mistake in paperwork.[274] The author did not describe the group as "terrorist" but "pro terrorist" which continued to soften the idea that the People's Mujahideen were not a threat to America. Another important note is the translation that Carney provided the readership. He translated Mujahideen to "People's Crusaders" instead of the more accurate translation of "Warriors who partake in jihad" or "Holy Warriors." This Christianization of their name makes them far more relatable to a country of predominantly Christian consumers. By making the group more familiar to the readers it made the group less threatening. While "crusade" still holds conflict context it is weighted with moral Christian history deemed familiar and therefore less threatening. When you add the translation to the label of "pro terrorist" the piece becomes less and less a piece about terrorism but an example of the Justice system squandering resources on a piece of misfiled paperwork. Both of these pieces make it clear that the word "terrorist" did not hold nearly the weight that the American populace placed upon it after 9/11. At this point, the word was not one describing a threat, but instead remained a tactic.

Post 9/11

When considering the twenty first century, one of the defining moments in American history was the attack on the twin towers in 2001. The attack introduced an era of fear, war, and widespread Islamophobia. Surprisingly, this hostility did not spread to newspapers' portrayal of the mujahideen immediately. The paper by Bleich, Nisar, and Abdelhamid suggested that *New York Times* headlines became increasingly more positive towards muslims after terrorist attacks.[275] Further examination of primary sources revealed that there was more of mixed

[274] Leo H. Carney "State Curbing Iranian Charity" (New York City) January 5, 1986
[275] Erik Bleich, Hasher Nisar, and Rana Abdelhamid, "The effect of terrorist events on media portrayal of Islam and Muslims: evidence from New York Times headlines, 1985-2013" *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2016, 1119

reaction for portrayal of the mujahideen specifically. The four noticeable trends from articles featuring the mujahideen from 2001 to 2003 were revealed to be; the positive portrayal of the mujahideen with in gendered frames and political advocacy before hitting the road block of the "moral weight" of the word "terrorist" and resting with negative depictions of the mujahideen. Even with the negativity, we are able to see the appropriation of terrorist narrative by the print media to soothe and sell papers through the American mythos.

The idea of positive frames in journalism had been introduced in the examination of portrayals of the mujahideen from the 1979 to 1989, and similar observations occur in the post 9/11 articles. The gendered headline "Aftereffects: The Mujahedeen; Women Brush Off the Hardships of Rebel Life" was published on April 29, 2003 by David Rohde. As can already be deciphered by the headline, Rohde used positive gender analysis to accent American values within the People's Mujahedeen. The article focused on the female fighters within the organization and used that angle to mention the "People's Mujahideen were the first terrorist group to sign a cease-fire with American forces." The stories of these women were heavily romanticized, calling them "Children of Revolutionaries" who wanted only to live in a democratic Iran.[276] The portrayal of the People's Mujahideen was far more positive and created a connection between American readership and female fighters. No longer were the mujahideen to be feared, but instead should be praised for their valour as the first to form a cease fire. The mention of the "cease fire" itself is invited further analysis into American nationalism and Foreign Policy. During this time period, both of these concepts relied heavily on public acceptance of the identity of the American military not as the conquering colonizers, but instead

[276] David Rohde "Aftereffects: The Mujahedeen; Women Brush Off the Hardships of Rebel Life" (New York City) April 29, 2003

the "liberators."[277] From both this and the gendered perspective, the People's Mujahideen no longer appeared as the terrorists that they had been labelled, but instead a people that needed American guidance. A series of articles by the *New York Times* printed coverage of the People's Mujahideen as terrorists, but always finished the article with strong imagery and dialogue as to why the Mujahideen should be accepted instead of eradicated as terrorists. Just as the American government saw the People's mujahideen as a natural opposition to the Khomeini government, Congress and academics continued to see the mujahideen not as warriors of bin Laden, but as "freedom fighters." On December 9, 2001, William Safire published the article "The Way We Live Now" which discussed the history and the meaning of the words "invest" and secondly, "mujahideen." Half way through the article, Safire shifted his focus to the meaning of mujahideen. The majority of the article discussed the history of the mujahideen before assigning them with the term terrorist.[278] An important note, is that although he labels them as such, he also discredits the label by saying "what some of us call terrorists." The lack of a universal resounding statement on whether the mujahideen were terrorists casted doubt on the designation of the group as such. Additionally, Safire only mentioned the activities of the mujahideen that pertained to American interests. In discussing their protests of the Shah of Iran, the quote he used was dismissive of the mujahideen as a threat. When he quoted the words of Saddam Hussein it used the power of a double negative: "Those are the ones whom Khomeini calls mujahidin. Those so-called mujahidin are traitors."[279] By incorporating this specific quote, the mujahideen transform into "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." After all, if a notorious terrorist such as Hussein considered them to be traitors, then they must therefore be allies. The final important

[277] Paul T. McCarteney, "American Nationalism and U.S. Foreign Policy from September 11 to the Iraq War" *Political Science Quarterly*. 119 (3). 2004. 406
[278] William Safire "The Way We Live Now:12-9-01: On Language; Invest, New York Cit: The New York Times Dec 9, 2001
[279] Ibid

piece of note, is that he never associates them with the attacks of 9/11. Safire calls them terrorists, and provided a context of their history, but never described the actions that they undertook. For an article published only three months after the attacks, it would have been expected to see some negativity within the newspapers. Instead we continue to see the trend of isolation of mujahideen from the rest of Islamic militant groups. By isolating the group within the public eye, the transformation of the mujahideen into a legitimate medium for American interests can be justified and understood by the public. The next level in which the mujahideen become portrayed within a positive light is in the coverage of the case against Navid Taj for accusations of abetting terrorists. The headline condemned Taj as an ally to terrorists, but transitioned into the debate of the designation of the People's Mujahideen as terrorists. Winter listed the support of senators and the Clinton administration's recognition of the mujahideen as a "legitimate resistance movement." As Bhatia noted in his article discussing the mujahideen as a whole, the concept of resistance movements who rose against unjust governments created a sense of "legitimacy to rule."[280] While this was primarily applied within the Middle Eastern context, it is supplicated by the American idea of the People's Mujahideen as a natural opposition to the Iraq government. The article is then completed by stating that case against Taj never should have occurred because the "Mojahedin was unlawfully designated a terrorist group."[281] Winter's article uses history to place the mujahideen in a positive light and then the nostalgia[282] of the Clinton administration to explain the events of the case as one improperly accused. The final point of advocacy of the mujahideen in the *New York Times* surprisingly comes in the coverage

[280] Michael Bhatia "The Future of the Mujahideen: Legitimacy, Legacy and Demobilization in Post-Bonn Afghanistan" *International Peacekeeping*, 14(1) 2007. 92

[281] Greg Winter, "A Nation Challenged: Fund-Raising; Aiding Friend Or Iranian Foe Is Issue in Case" New York City: *The New York Times* March 22, 2002

[282] Betty Houchin Winfield, Barbara Friedman, & Vivara Trisnadi "History as the Metaphor through Which the Current World is Viewed: British and American newspapers' uses of history following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks" *Journalism Studies* 2002, 291

of an American attack on mujahideen bases. Once more, the author Douglas Jehl was skeptical of the groups designation as a terrorists, and placed them as a natural opposition to anti-American governments. Jehl's diction was accentuated by his choice of crass quote from the American military, describing the attack as "'bombed the heck' out of the mujahideen group's bases." By far one of the most interesting quotations provided came from Yleem Poblete, who was the staff director for the House International Relations Committee. He said:

> We made it very clear that these folks are pro-democracy, antifundamentalism, antiterrorism, and helpful to the U.S in providing information about the activities of the Iranian regime, and advocates of a secular government in Iran…They are our friends, not out enemies.[283]

The quotation itself provided an explanation on the press's interpretation of the mujahideen. Since the mujahideen were fighting for American values such as democracy and would further American relations in the Middle East, they should be recognized as a legitimate organization. The journalist continuously casted doubt on President Bush and used empathetic language to describe the plight of the mujahideen. Very clearly, in all of these article is the sympathy and support that both Congress and the *New York Times* placed on the Mujahideen. While the articles do originally label the groups as terrorists, it is usually contrasted by listing the support of congress and using language to form a connection with their audience. By constantly portraying the mujahideen this way, the *New York Times* refuted Bush's narrative of the People's Mujahideen as a terrorist organization.

Before attending to the final part of this question, the fulcrum of this discussion towards positive and negative portrayals, is the moral debate as to whether the motive justified the means. In a follow up article to the Navid Taj case Winter shifted the tone of his coverage three months later. He still covered the history of the case and the decision by the judge to drop all charges

[283] Douglas Jehl A Nation at War: Oil Supply; U.S. Bombs Iranian Guerrilla Forces Based in Iraq" New York City: *New York Times* April 17, 2003

because the "foreign group did not have a chance to defend themselves." This time around, instead of quoting the Clinton administration with a positive portrayal, he drew attention to how they were labelled a terrorist organization towards the tail end of his presidency. In addition he reported the withdrawal of the approval by many within Congress and was far less friendly describing the mujahideen. He lists key words such as "attacking","bombing" and "assassinating"[284] all of which are terms associated with terrorism since nineteenth century Russia and "the People's Will."[285] Although the judge's decision follows alongside the idea of American political values, the tone of the article indicates the moral shift in the perception of terrorism. The article published in 2002, draws far more negativity towards the People's Mujahideen. Winter's listed all of the points that he had in March but there was a marked difference in attention to the method instead of the motive. So although there were positive statements, they were followed up with negative words describing their actions. The other article which followed this trend was: "Aftereffects: The Mujahideen; Women Brush Off the Hardships of Rebel Life" but becomes continuously more negative despite the gendered lens. The People's Mujahideen were the natural opposition, they had the support of Congress, and were previously used as an anti-soviet blockade, but that is no longer enough. It is the first time within the paper that the phrase "we do not negotiate with terrorists" was used outside of the President Bush's speeches. Although the context of the article is in the discussion of the cease fire between the People's Mujahideen and the American military[286] the content leans far closer to an affirmation as terrorists, and the conviction against the action. So although the authors provide the same values and conditions of the past, there is more attention paid to the importance of action, instead

[284] Greg Winter "Judge Drops Case Against 7 Tied to Group Called Terrorist" New York City*: New York Times* June 24, 2002
[285] Randall Law, "Terrorism: A History" (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016)
[286] Michael R. Gordon with Douglas Jehl, "Aftereffects: Politics; On Order From Bush, U.S. Troops in Iraq Begin Disarming Iranian Opposition Group" New York City: *New York Times* May 10, 2003

of motive. It is with this point as the fulcrum, that the portrayals of the mujahideen turn negative and references American exceptionalism.

The last pattern in *New York Times* articles from 2001 to 2003 fulfilled the original expectations of the study. The article "Threats and Responses: The President's Speech; Bush Sees 'Urgent Duty' to Pre-empt Attack by Iraq" by David E. Sanger on October 8, 2002 covered President Bush's address on Hussein's access to chemical and biological weapons.[287] The majority of the article was simply a highlight the speech, but the quotations offered fit within theories provided by McCartney as well as Winfield, Friedman and Trisnadi. As previously discussed, the media- and Bush- would repeatedly use history to help provide context and narrative for the issues of the time.[288] Within this article, Sanger reported Bush's usage of the repeated use of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cold War to align Hussein with Stalin and Iraq with the USSR.[289] Although the focus of this article was Hussein, it created a tone of universality of the mujahideen no longer as protectors of America, but as a threat. When the term "mujahideen" is mentioned, it is a generalized reminded the public of the untenability of Islamic Militants to one nation. Silva noted that it is that detachment from a nation that led to a radicalized portrayal of Muslims within the media.[290] By underlying the term with this fear, Sanger sealed the coffin for a negative portrayal of the mujahideen by quoting "that "Mr. Hussein is reconstituting his nuclear weapons program with "a group he calls his nuclear mujahideen, his nuclear holy warriors."" A reoccurrence within Bush's speeches and American

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[287] David E. Sanger, "Threats and Responses: The President's Speech; Bush Sees 'Urgent Duty' to Pre-empt Attack by Iraq" New York City: *New York Times* Oct. 8, 2002

[288] Betty Houchin Winfield, Barbara Friedman, & Vivara Trisnadi "History as the Metaphor through Which the Current World is Viewed: British and American newspapers' uses of history following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks" *Journalism Studies* 2002, 290

[289] David E. Sanger, "Threats and Responses: The President's Speech; Bush Sees 'Urgent Duty' to Pre-empt Attack by Iraq" New York City: *New York Times* Oct. 8, 2002

[290] Derek M.D. Silva "The Othering of Muslims: Discourses of Radicalization in the New York Times, 1969-2014" *Sociological Forum* 2017, 142

nationalism was the constant push for the removal of Weapons of Mass Destruction from the Middle East.[291] In associating the title of mujahideen with a weapon of Mass Destruction and by providing no context for the term, Sanger and Bush are aligning the mujahideen with multiple fears. The first a fear of enemies of the United States holding nuclear weapons, and the second drawing upon metaphor of the Cuban Missile Crisis. This created a situation as dire as the Cold War and engrained the idea of mujahideen as enemies into the American mythos. A reflection of this mythos towards the mujahideen comes from an opinion submitted by Raymond Long on April 29 2003. The lack of evidence to place Raymond Long within professional communities placed him as a member of the American citizenry. The piece itself entitled "A U.S. Accord With Terrorists" is response to an article that covered the cease fire between the People's Mujahideen and the American military. This piece drew on signposts of past argumentation; "US never negotiates with terrorists," the US should not pick and choose which terrorists they support and which they do not, and how state terrorism should not be used by allies of the United States. Long finishes with: "This action should be strongly opposed by our leaders because it goes against the core values that our nation espouses."[292] This memorable line is in direct opposition to the coverage during the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, and even select coverage from the post 9/11 samples. There is a complete evolution in the portrayal of the mujahideen as to where this study started. No longer are the mujahideen alluded to with American values, but instead are now in direct opposition to the ideals held by the nation. On more of a historiographical note, the idea of the "war on terror" falls within the national fervour to completely eradicate terrorism while maintaining the people-and therefore the true spirit of America-as being morally correct. This publication as well as others like it placed mujahideen not as the holy warriors of American

[291] Paul T. McCarteney, "American Nationalism and U.S. Foreign Policy from September 11 to the Iraq War" *Political Science Quarterly*. 119 (3). 2004. 414
[292] Raymond Long, "A U.S. Accord with Terrorists" New Canaan: *New York Times* April 30, 2003

values, but now as a force that Americans can unite against as an enemy. Bush, journalists, and public opinion halted the discord between Congress, and Foreign Policy consultants for the mujahideen as advocators for American policy, but as a unifier through hatred.

So what does all this tell us about terrorism? This study tells us that whether positive or negative, the portrayal of the mujahideen have been used as a character for American propaganda to provide either an underdog or a villain to rally the American people to a cause. Whether it was posing the mujahideen as foreign advocators for American interests, or dichotomizing the conflict in the Middle East into "Good or Evil"[293] to assist in creating a unified populace[294] the *New York Times* was able to use their portrayals of the mujahideen to influence American society "positively." The term "positively" is used very loosely and aligns more so with the idea of "what was good for America." The portrayals of these terrorist organizations was not what was expected. Instead of a sudden and certain condemnation of their actions, it was a slow and gradual adoption of the American narrative for moral superiority over those who would use terrorist tactics.[295] This paper was never about justifying the designation of mujahideen groups as being terrorists. This was a paper to better understand the journey of America's relationship with terrorism and the understanding of terrorism as a continuum. As of September 8, 2012 the People's Mujahideen were removed from the U.S. Department of State's

[293] Paul T. McCarteney, "American Nationalism and U.S. Foreign Policy from September 11 to the Iraq War" *Political Science Quarterly*. 119 (3). 2004. 409
[294] Jothik Krishnaiah, Nancy Signorielli, & Douglas M. McLeod "The Evil Empire Revisited: New York Times Coverage of the Soviet Intervention in and Withdrawal From Afghanistan" *Journalism Quarterly* 1993. 649
[295] Paul T. McCarteney, "American Nationalism and U.S. Foreign Policy from September 11 to the Iraq War" *Political Science Quarterly*. 119 (3). 2004. 408

Foreign Terrorist Organizations List.[296] This group specifically as well as nine other terrorist organizations with the term "mujahideen" remain on the United Nations Security Council[297] and Interpol's[298] list of terrorists. Today, the People's Mujahideen have a professional looking website offered in Arabic, English, and French.[299] If anything, this essay proved the fickleness and the fluctuation of both the media and western society's stance on terrorism. Depending on who is in power at the time and which morals are prevalent justified or condemned the action of terrorists. If the understanding of a terrorist is one who is a subnational organization who deemed themselves oppressed and held a zero sum ideology, the mujahideen-especially the People's Mujahideen- fit the description. However, whether these terrorist groups are ordained as holy warriors or a demonic threat to American values remains at the whim of the media and the moral environment of the American state.

[296] Bureau of Counterterrorism "Foreign Terrorist Organizations" US Department of State, retrieved from https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm

[297] United Nations " The List established and maintained pursuant to Security Council res. 1267/1989/2253" United Nations. Retrieved from https://scsanctions.un.org/fop/fop?xml=htdocs/resources/xml/en/consolidated.xml&xslt=htdocs/resources/xsl/en/al-qaida.xsl

[298] Interpol "Harakat Ul-Mujahidin/HUM" Interpol, retrieved from https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5282053

[299] People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran "Home Page" People's Mojahhedin Organization, retrieved from https://english.mojahedin.org

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