Nothing required so much effort on the
part of the Romans to subdue the nations around them, as well as those
of
more distant countries, as the love of liberty
which these people cherished in those days; and which they defended
with so much obstinacy, that nothing but the
exceeding valour of the Romans could ever have subjugated them.
For we know from many instances to what danger
they exposed themselves to preserve or recover their liberty,
and what vengeance they practised upon those
who had deprived them of it. The lessons of history teach us also,
on the other hand, the injuries people suffer
from servitude. And whilst in our own times there is only one country
in which we can say that free communities
exist, in those ancient times all countries contained numerous cities that
enjoyed entire liberty. [...]And it is easy
to understand whence that affection for liberty arose in the
people, for they had seen that cities never
increased in dominion or wealth unless they were free. And certainly it
is
wonderful to think of the greatness which
Athens attained within the space of a hundred years after having free
herself from the tyranny of Pisistratus; and
still more wonderful is it to reflect upon the greatness which Rome
achieved after she was rid of her kings. The
cause of this is manifest, for it is not individual prosperity, but the
general good, that makes cities great; and
certainly the general good is regarded nowhere but in republics, because
whatever they do is for the common benefit,
and should it happen to prove an injury to one or more individuals,
those for whose benefit the thing is done
are so numerous that they can always carry the measure against the few
that are injured by it. But the very reverse
happens where there is a prince whose private interests are generally in
opposition to those of the city, whilst the
measures taken for the benefit of the city are seldom deemed personally
advantageous by the prince. This state of
things soon leads to a tyranny, the least evil of which is to check the
advance of the city in its career of prosperity,
so that it grows neither in power nor wealth, but on the contrary
rather retrogrades. And if fate should have
it that the tyrant is enterprising, and by his courage and valour extends
his dominions, it will never be for the benefit
of the city, but only for his own; for he will never bestow honours and
office upon the good and brave citizens over
whom he tyrannises, so that he may not have occasion to suspect and
fear them. Nor will he make the states which
he conquers subject or tributary to the city of which he is the despot,
because it would not be to his advantage to
make that city powerful, but it will always be for his interest to keep
the state disunited, so that each place and
country shall recognise him only as master; thus he alone, and not his
country, profits by his conquests. Those who
desire to have this opinion confirmed by many other arguments, need
but read Xenophon's treatise On Tyranny.
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© Paul Halsall, October
1998
halsall@fordham.edu